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 Executive Summary 
 
 
We assess the international competitiveness of the dairy industries in Argentina and 
Chile, combining recent market intelligence gathered from field visits with quantitative 
simulations of global policy reform scenarios. Both countries exhibit strong potential for 
export growth but face significant internal and external barriers to expanding their dairy 
industries. Global policy reforms would resolve some of the international obstacles to 
their expansion. Argentina has great potential, but it is handicapped by its current 
macroeconomic policies, trade policy distortions, and the uncertainty associated with 
policy implementation. Chile is more limited in terms of natural capacity for expansion, 
but it has a positive trade and investment environment.  
 
Keywords: Argentina, agricultural trade policy, Chile, comparative advantage, 
competitiveness, dairy processing, exports, milk production. 
 
 
 
  
GLOBAL PROSPECTS FOR DAIRY IN ARGENTINA AND CHILE: 
EVIDENCE FROM FIELD VISITS AND MODEL SIMULATIONS 
 
 
As the Doha Round of negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) pro-
gresses, it is becoming clear that international dairy markets are likely to undergo sub-
stantial change. Dairy markets in many countries saw little impact from the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on agriculture because countries were able to protect domestic pro-
ducers and limit imports by establishing very restrictive tariff rate quotas (TRQ) with 
high over-quota duties. In addition, reductions in export subsidies were very modest, 
allowing the European Union and other countries with substantial producer support to 
continue to export dairy products despite high internal price supports. The significant 
tariff cuts and elimination of export subsidies currently proposed in the Doha negotia-
tions, if implemented, are likely to create notable shortages in international dairy markets 
until a new equilibrium is established. Rising world prices will undoubtedly generate a 
supply response in some countries, but it is not clear which countries will step in to fill 
the void created by the removal of subsidized dairy products. 
Combining information from field visits and formal policy reform analysis, this re-
port takes a closer look at the dairy sectors in Argentina and Chile to assess their potential 
for export growth in the coming decade. Many of the observations are the result of field 
visits by the authors in Argentina and Chile in November and December 2005. We use 
the information gathered from interviews with producers, industry participants, and 
government officials in combination with other research to point out factors favoring 
growth. We also highlight the obstacles that must be overcome in order for each country 
to realize its growth potential. We complement this expository discussion with new 
evidence obtained from simulations of potential Doha outcomes. The simulations place 
magnitudes, both on the potential impacts of a WTO agreement and on the likely re-
sponses by the Argentine and Chilean dairy industries to such an agreement.  
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Argentina 
In Argentina, the economic and political climate bears heavily on developments in 
the agricultural sector. Consequently, we begin our analysis of Argentina’s dairy industry 
with an overview of the political and economic institutions. Then, we focus directly on 
the characteristics and competitiveness of the industry in the context of the present 
political economy. 
The Political Environment 
Argentina is a representative democracy; however, this has not always been the case. 
Democratic rule has been repeatedly set aside by military coups. The last military dicta-
torship ended after Argentina’s defeat in the war with Great Britain in 1983 with the 
democratic election of President Raúl Alfonsín. Carlos Menem followed Alfonsín as 
president and remained in office until 1999, when Fernando de la Rúa was elected. 
Following several years of rapid price inflation, Menem and de la Rúa were able to 
reduce and stabilize inflation rates by fixing the Argentine peso to the U.S. dollar at a 
one-peso-to-one-dollar exchange rate. However, domestic inflation in Argentina was 
higher than U.S. inflation, which caused the currency to become dramatically overvalued 
relative to its buying power within Argentina. The currency overvaluation played a key 
role in the economic crisis that developed in 2001. Thereafter, de la Rúa could not 
manage the crisis or the violent riots, and he resigned on December 21, 2001. Several 
short-term interim presidents held office until the National Congress finally selected 
Eduardo Duhalde to rule until some sort of social and economic peace could be restored. 
Duhalde called for democratic elections, and Néstor Kirchner was chosen. Kirchner took 
office on 25 May 2003, and is expected to serve until 2007. 
Despite the civilian unrest, the armed forces remained firmly under civilian control. 
Menem and de la Rúa had exerted control over the military by reducing its funding. 
Kirchner has taken more active steps, forcing top ranked officers to resign and forcing 
younger officers to make an explicit commitment to preserve human rights and submit to 
the decisions of the civilian government. 
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Policy 
Eduardo Duhalde’s interim term was marked by the need to restore peace in the 
country and to soften the impact of the crisis on citizens after the forced devaluation of 
the local currency. In a matter of a few months, the Argentine peso lost three-quarters of 
its value. Duhalde employed a mixture of traditional Peronist populism (in the form of a 
monetary subsidy for heads of families) and neo-Keynesian economic principles to 
stabilize the economy and calm the social unrest. 
Néstor Kirchner, who belongs to the moderate center-left wing of Peronism (rooted 
in the leftist Peronist factions of the 1970s), continued Duhalde’s measures. Heavy taxes 
on exports have served to keep local prices of essential commodities in check while also 
increasing government revenue, especially from energy products and agricultural exports 
such as soybeans. 
Argentina’s restrictive monetary policy pursued in the 1990s has become aggres-
sively expansive. The Central Bank has injected large amounts of cash into the economy 
and bought dollars from currency markets in order to accumulate reserves. The fiscal 
policy is also expansive and lacking discipline. The government has increased private and 
public salaries by decree on several occasions and has encouraged negotiations between 
the private sector and the labor movements. Inflation has again become a concern. The 
government has frozen prices in certain sectors of the economy (e.g., milk, some foods, 
and natural gas) and put heavy pressure on others to limit price increases. Failure to 
comply on the part of beef producers led to a punitive suspension of exports for 180 days 
starting in March 2006, which was intended to increase domestic supply. These policies 
reduce the economic capital generated by previous administrations and seem destined for 
failure. 
Government Structure 
The constitution requires a balance between federal and provincial powers. In prac-
tice, political power is centralized with the president in charge, and provincial influence 
translates into fiscal transfers from federal to provincial levels. The president is head of 
state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The president appoints a cabinet 
whose chief runs the government on a day-to-day basis and can be removed by a majority 
vote in each chamber of the Congress. The president also appoints judges to the Supreme 
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Court, with the approval of the Senate. The legislature (National Congress) is bicameral 
and consists of a 257-member Chamber of Deputies (lower house) and a 72-member 
Senate (upper house). Each province also has its own constitution, roughly mirroring the 
structure of the national constitution. 
The president and vice president used to be elected indirectly by an electoral college 
to a single six-year term, and they were not allowed to seek immediate reelection. The 
constitutional reform of 1994, among other things, reduced the presidential term to four 
years, abolished the electoral college in favor of direct voting, and limited the president 
and vice president to two consecutive terms. They are allowed to stand for a third term or 
more after an interval of at least one term. The president appoints cabinet ministers and 
the constitution grants him considerable power, including a line-item veto. 
Provinces traditionally have sent two senators, elected by provincial legislatures, to 
the upper house of Congress. Voters in the federal capital of Buenos Aires elected an 
electoral college, which chose the city’s senators. The revised constitution mandated a 
transition to direct election for all senators beginning in 2001. The constitution also adds 
a third senator who represents the largest minority party from each province and the 
capital. The revised constitution reduced senatorial terms from nine to six years. One-
third of the Senate will stand for re-election every two years. 
Members of the Chamber of Deputies are directly elected to four-year terms. Voters 
elect half the members of the lower house every two years through a system of propor-
tional representation. One difference between these elections and the U.S. system is that 
voters chose a party, and the party chooses the list of potential senators or deputies. The 
number of representatives selected by a party is proportional to the number of votes the 
party receives. Deputies therefore spend time and effort to obtain a place on the list and 
do not need to represent a set of local voters. The skills required to become part of a party 
list are different from those required to represent voters, and, as a result, Argentina has 
severe problems with political corruption. In addition, politicians are encouraged to adopt 
populist policies that attract votes for the party, even when the policies work to the 
detriment of the regional constituents they represent. An example of this behavior is the 
recent decision to ban the exportation of Argentine beef, so as to reduce beef prices. 
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The Argentine Economy 
Argentina has the resource base to be a vibrant economic power. It has an abundant 
natural resource base, a highly literate population, good transportation and communica-
tion infrastructure, an export-oriented agricultural sector, and a diversified industrial 
base. However, economic mismanagement has kept Argentina’s standard of living much 
below its potential. The most recent crises were precipitated by the forced currency 
devaluation, which caused real GDP to fall by 10.9% in 2002. GDP has rebounded, 
growing at an annual rate of 9% from 2003 to 2005 (see Figure 1). This growth is being 
led by a revival in domestic demand, solid exports, and favorable external conditions. 
The government boosted spending ahead of the October 2005 midterm congressional 
elections, but strong revenue performance allowed Argentina to maintain a budget 
surplus. Inflation has been rising steadily and reached 12.3% in 2005. 
 
 
Source: IMF, 2006 
FIGURE 1. Argentina: gross domestic product growth rates, 1995-2005 
 
The Monetary Climate 
 Inflation. Annual consumer price inflation from January 1995 to January 2006 is shown 
in Figure 2. After a surge during the recent economic crisis the inflation rate fell to almost 
zero but has more recently returned to a level of about  10% in 2006. Recent price controls 
coerced from several industries help understate the true inflationary pressures at work. 
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Currency and Exchange Rate. Prior to January 2002, the Argentine exchange rate 
was fixed relative to the U.S. dollar; however, after January 2002 it was allowed to 
depreciate to a level of almost four pesos to the dollar (see Figure 3). Since January 2003, 
the Argentine currency has been trading in a range of approximately three pesos to the 
dollar. With slightly higher inflation rates than in the U.S., the Argentine currency should 
eventually begin to depreciate. 
 
 
Source: IMF, 2006 
FIGURE 2. Argentina: consumer and producer price inflation rates, 1995–2006 
 
 
Source: IMF, 2006 
FIGURE 3. Argentina: exchange rate depreciation, 1995–2006 
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Sovereign Risk. All of the major rating agencies downgraded Argentine bonds in 
2002, and none of these agencies has yet upgraded. Current sovereign risk ratings are 
shown in Figures 4–6. 
Future Economic Progress 
Using the usual macroeconomic standards by which economies are compared, Ar-
gentina appears to be ready for stable growth and prosperity. Growth is rapid, unem-
ployment is falling quickly, and monetary reserves and the currency are strong. All of this 
information appears to conflict with the extremely low ratings the country is given by 
international ratings agencies. However, the international ratings take into account the 
investment climate and risk that are not reflected in the macroeconomic indicators, 
resulting in the lackluster outlook for the economy.  
 
Source: Axco Insurance Information Services Ltd. 
FIGURE 4. Argentina: Moody’s Investors Service long-term foreign currency ratings 
 
It is true that economic growth has surged, but this growth is coming from an extremely 
low base. The disaster that hit Argentina in 2001 and 2002 was worse in relative terms 
than the Great Depression in the United States. The improvement in monetary reserves 
and the currency reflects the new government’s attempts to discourage imports through 
import substitution. The government has also improved its own financial performance by 
increasing taxes and tariffs on export sectors such as agriculture. The government is 
essentially subsidizing the sectors of the economy that do not have an international 
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Source: Axco Insurance Information Services Ltd. 
FIGURE 5. Argentina: Standard and Poor’s long-term foreign currency ratings 
 
 
Source: Axco Insurance Information Services Ltd. 
FIGURE 6. Argentina: Fitch IBCA, Duff and Phelps long-term foreign currency 
ratings 
 
comparative advantage and taxing the sectors that do. The economy is currently benefit-
ing from this transition, as import-substituting sectors grow and as the export sectors 
struggle to survive. However, economic theory and historical experiences of other 
countries that have attempted to grow in this manner both suggest that this approach will 
eventually fail. The outlook is even worse when one considers the corruption that is 
endemic within the political establishment and that the government is holding down the 
reported rate of price inflation by artificial means. Hence, the short, and perhaps the 
medium, outlook for Argentina is positive, but the long-run outlook remains pessimistic. 
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Impact of Fiscal Policies on the Agricultural Sector 
Argentina does not belong to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD), and therefore internationally comparable data on the degree to which 
the government subsidizes or taxes the agricultural sector are not readily available. 
However, it is very clear that Argentina taxes agriculture heavily. Soybean farmers pay 
23.5% of revenue as a tax. Corn and wheat farmers pay 20%. Meat has a 15% export tax 
when exports are permitted. As mentioned earlier, beef exports are currently banned to 
temporarily control price inflation, which has the same effect as an even larger (prohibi-
tive) export tax.  
Robert Hoff, the current agricultural attaché at the U.S. embassy, recently said the 
following: “The government looks at agriculture as a way to fund its social programs. 
Tax collection doesn’t work in Argentina. Paying up front on exports, it’s easy to collect 
from the farmers. Although agriculture has a huge impact on the economy—representing 
directly 13% of the domestic product and 30% indirectly—the government treats it like a 
stepchild” (Barnett, 2006).  
Description of the Dairy Industry 
The dairy industry in Argentina can trace its origins back to the 1886 Exhibition of 
Rural Society Argentina, where Erik Adde demonstrated the operation of a mechanical 
cream separator developed by Of Laval (founder of DeLaval). Seeing the potential 
profitability of butter production, early investors began producing milk for butter manu-
facture. As early as 1895, Argentine creameries began exporting butter to Europe. 
However, like several other countries, growing milk supplies relative to processing 
capacity in the early 1900s caused milk prices to decline, and producers responded by 
forming cooperatives to improve profitability. Recognizing the vast milk production 
potential in Argentina’s Pampa region, investors from Europe and Australia brought new 
technologies to the country and helped finance the expansion of the industry in the early 
years (CIL, 2006a).  
In 1990, Argentina ranked 17th in world milk production, and milk production con-
tinued to grow at an annual rate of 6% throughout the 1990s. By 1999, Argentine milk 
production reached 10.3 million metric tons (mmt), placing Argentina 13th in global milk 
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production, right behind New Zealand. In that same year, Argentina was a major exporter 
of whole milk powder (WMP) and a growing exporter of cheese. However, the economic 
crisis in 2002 prompted a severe contraction of dairy production. The sector has emerged 
from the crisis as a viable industry with tremendous potential. The impacts of Argentina’s 
economic crisis on the dairy sector are discussed in more detail later in this report. The 
remainder of this section briefly describes the primary characteristics of Argentina’s 
dairy sector. 
Dairy Production Characteristics 
Argentina’s dairy industry is concentrated in the central and east-central parts of the 
country, in Córdoba, Santa Fe, and Buenos Aires provinces. Figure 7 shows the primary 
milk producing regions and their respective shares of total milk production. These 
production areas are located in the cropland regions of the Pampas. The exception to this 
is the Buenos Aires River Basin, which is part of the more humid Flooding Pampa. The 
cropland Pampa is the primary cropping area in Argentina, so dairy pastures compete 
with soybeans, corn, and wheat production for land. Many dairy farms are diversified 
operations devoting between 10% and 50% of their land to crop production. Sowing 
fields to improved pastures—typically alfalfa, tall fescue, and clover—is part of the crop 
rotation pattern to preserve soil fertility (Garbulsky and Deregibus, 2005). However, the 
direct competition between crops and dairy pastures makes milk production in Argentina 
unusually sensitive to the relative profitability of crop and dairy activities. Farmers in the 
region suggest that as much as 25% of the planted area may move in and out of pasture 
depending on crop and milk prices (Personal communication with SanCor, 29 November 
2005). 
Farms located in the two primary dairy regions of Santa Fe and Córdoba are typi-
cally pasture-based operations, and dairy cows are not confined while they are lactating. 
Dairy operations in western Santa Fe and eastern Córdoba often milk 150 to 250 cows, 
while farms in southern Córdoba and western Buenos Aires may have 350 to 600 head. 
Roughly 50% of the dairy farms in Santa Fe province have fewer than 200 head;  
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FIGURE 7. Milk production regions in Argentina (Ostrowski and Deblitz, 2001) 
 
however, these farms in total own less than 20% of the province’s dairy cattle inventory. 
The majority of dairy cattle are on farms with 300 to 500 cows (Sodiro and Castignani, 
2005). Producers in both regions supplement cattle diets with corn silage and some grain 
concentrates. Supplemental feeding tends to increase with the size of the operation, 
ranging from 600 kg/head per year on small farms to 2,500 kg/head per year on the larger 
operations in Buenos Aires province. The primary dairy cattle breeds in Argentina are 
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Holstein breeds, and milk output per animal runs between 4.0 and 7.3 metric tons (mt) 
(Ostrowski and Deblitz, 2001). The national average was 4.7 mt/cow in 2005. Productiv-
ity increases with supplemental feeding, but costs also increase. 
Variable costs for milk production run between $0.07 and $0.09 per liter. The cost of 
capital is about $0.03–$0.05 per liter, and total production costs are $0.15–$0.17 per liter. 
An index of dairy product prices in Argentina tends to follow international dairy product 
prices, making the dairy industry vulnerable to changes in international market conditions 
and trade policies (Personal communication with SanCor, 1 December 2005). 
An example of a small but forward-looking dairy farm in the western Santa Fe region 
is the Vincente Bauducco family farm. Figure 8 summarizes the farm’s characteristics. The 
research team visited the farm on 1 December 2005. The farm is a father-son operation, 
with the farm’s pastureland and buildings split between two locations. At the time of the 
visit, Mr. Bauducco had 112 lactating cows, which produced about 220 liters of milk per 
day. The farm has been using artificial insemination for about 30 years, with semen 
imported from France, Canada, and Italy. Mr. Bauducco sells his milk to SanCor, one of 
the largest cooperatives and milk processors in Argentina. He feeds his cows a diet based 
on alfalfa and corn silage, supplemented with cottonseed and sweetened sorghum. The 
local cooperative develops a balanced diet that is usually followed by the producers in 
this area, but the feeding regimen is not required by the cooperative. The bulk of the 
farm’s arable land is planted to alfalfa pasture, but about 20% is planted with soybeans. 
The farm has a small herringbone milking parlor, and the cows are milked twice daily. 
The milk goes directly into the 5,000 liter storage tank purchased from a French com-
pany. SanCor collects the milk daily and performs quality tests. The identity of the 
sample collected at the farm is achieved by placing a bar code on the vial that corre-
sponds to the farm. The test results are available for the farmer to view on the Internet as 
soon as the sample is processed. Milk prices are based on the characteristics of the 
sample (temperature, fat, protein, other solids, lactose, urea, and bacteria count). Milk 
prices are set by SanCor, and there is about a 15% to 20% price variation throughout the 
year. The farmers and the cooperative have not organized any sort of pricing or delivery 
scheme to smooth out the inherent seasonality of production. SanCor has minimum 
quality and technology standards (such as on-farm cold storage requirements), and these 
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FIGURE 8. Farm data for the Vincent Bauducco Farm in Sante Fe, Argentina 
 
standards have imposed some additional costs on its producers. Mr. Bauducco said that 
investments in new technologies were difficult prior to the financial crisis because there 
was not enough profitability in dairying. Currently, the local cooperative handles the 
coordination between farmers and SanCor’s processing plants, but there are plans to 
allow farmers to market milk directly to SanCor in the future. 
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The Bauducco farm is somewhat atypical for farms in its region in two important re-
spects. First, the Bauducco family has been very successful at purchasing and applying 
modern technologies and management practices in its operation. Second, the adoption of 
new technologies has enabled the Bauduccos to achieve above-average productivity. 
According to a recent study conducted by the National Institute of Agricultural Technol-
ogy (Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria) in the region serviced by the 
Experiment Station in Rafaela (Santa Fe province), the average dairy farm in the area, 
including the Bauducco farm, has between 100 and 300 hectares of land. About half of 
those farms specialize in dairy production, and 35% integrate dairy and crop production. 
The average age of the dairy owners is 50. These statistics are consistent with the 
Bauducco farm. Unlike the Bauducco operation, more than two-thirds of the farms in the 
region produce 16 liters/cow/day or less. The study suggests that credit constraints, low 
milk prices, a lack of human capital, and a lack of entrepreneurial skills have prevented 
other farms in the region from achieving the productivity of the Bauducco farm. The 
study also concludes that these older, less productive dairy producers are likely to leave 
the industry in the future, as the competition from larger and more progressive farms 
make it unprofitable to continue (Sodiro and Castignani, 2005). 
Milk Processing 
Argentina’s dairy processing sector is dominated by 10 large companies that process 
more than half of the milk produced in the country. The three largest dairy companies are 
SanCor, Mastellone Hermanos, and Saputo. There are also about 1,000 mid-sized plants 
that specialize primarily in cheese production. According to one industry analyst, the 
processing capacity in the country was at roughly 90% utilization in December 2005. 
Argentina’s dairy processing sector is divided into two distinct components: an export-
oriented segment and an “informal” or domestic segment. The export-oriented firms 
account for 50%-55% of Argentina’s dairy production, and the remaining 45%-50% stays 
on the domestic market (Personal communication with SanCor, 1 December 2005). 
Figure 9 shows the distribution of processed milk among the major dairy products. At 
just under 9 kg/person, Argentines consume more cheese per person than the population 
of any other South American country. It is not surprising that 36% of milk produced in 
Argentina is used to manufacture cheese. Roughly 21% of the milk used for cheese is  
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Source: CIL, 2006b. 
FIGURE 9. Distribution of milk for processing in Argentina, 2004 
 
processed into hard cheeses, 42% is used for soft cheeses, and the remaining 37% is 
processed into semi-hard varieties. Semi-hard cheeses are the most common types 
exported, accounting for 62% of all Argentine cheese exports in 2004. WMP is the 
second-largest use for industrial milk. More than half of the WMP produced in Argentina 
is bound for export markets. Domestic consumption of fresh and fluid products is about 
48 kg/person (CIL, 2006b). 
 
SanCor Cooperative. SanCor began in 1938 as a milk cooperative association of 
dairy farmers. The majority of the cooperative’s farms are located in the Pampas in the 
provinces of Santa Fe and Cordoba, hence the name SanCor. The cooperative controls 
about 18% of Argentina’s milk production, and it receives milk from about 2,100 
farmers. Milk quality has not been a problem for SanCor since 1995, when the coopera-
tive stopped collecting warm milk from farmers. The bulk of SanCor’s products are 
destined for the domestic market. SanCor uses independent marketing agents to distrib-
ute its products to smaller stores and shops, but it deals directly with supermarkets. 
SanCor has a research and development lab to develop new products. It currently has 
two product lines: a premium brand and a value brand. SanCor also has a marketing 
agreement with Nestlé to distribute Nestlé’s products domestically in Argentina. In 
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2004, SanCor established a cooperative marketing agreement with Arla Foods, which is 
owned by Fonterra. The goal of the alliance was to use Fonterra’s international market-
ing connections to expand SanCor’s export potential. SanCor’s primary foreign markets 
include other Mercusor countries (i.e., Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay), 
Mexico, Algeria, and the United States (Personal communication with SanCor, 29 
November 2005).  
Mastellone Hermanos. SanCor’s primary domestic competitor is Mastellone Her-
manos, which also processes about 18% of total milk production. Mastellone focuses 
primarily on fresh products for the domestic market, particularly in the Buenos Aires 
region. Mastellone also exported $52 million in dairy products in 2005 (mainly WMP) to 
32 countries (Tomás, 2006). Mastellone has an alliance with Danone to market Danone’s 
products in Argentina. 
Saputo. Saputo is Canada’s largest dairy processor and Argentina’s third-largest 
processor. Saputo branched into the South American market by purchasing Molfino 
Hermanos S.A., and it currently operates two large processing facilities in Argentina. 
Saputo’s processing capacity is estimated at 1.6 million liters, roughly 10% of total milk 
production. Prior to the acquisition, Molfino was exporting between 40% and 50% of its 
output (Wesselink, 2006). 
Dairy Trade and Policy 
Argentina is the third-largest exporter of WMP, shipping 185 thousand metric tons 
(tmt) in 2005. Since the start of the recovery from the economic crisis in 2003, Argentina’s 
cheese exports have nearly doubled, reaching 45 tmt in 2005. However, the Argentine 
government put a damper on export growth by increasing the export taxes on dairy prod-
ucts. In addition, the government no longer provides partial refund on the value added tax 
(VAT) for exported dairy products. The Argentine processors use plants in Uruguay when 
they face processing capacity constraints. This allows them to bypass the export tax but of 
course involves shipping milk to Uruguay, the neighboring country to the east. The export 
tax level is a political decision that appears to be driven primarily by the financial needs of 
the government and, to some extent, by the desire to keep sufficient products in country to 
satisfy domestic demand at lower prices, as recent price freezes have been enacted (Per-
sonal Communication with SanCor, 1 December 2005). 
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Transportation costs for milk powder exports from plants located in Santa Fe are 
roughly $16/mt to truck the product to Buenos Aires and an additional $100/mt to ship 
the product to a port in the Middle East or Europe. If international prices for cheese were 
sufficiently high, a SanCor analyst suggested that roughly one-third of the informal 
cheese production would be able to meet international standards and could be exported. 
Roughly 14% of Argentina’s dairy exports go to Mercosur countries, 14% to NAFTA, 
35% to African countries, and 23% to ALADI countries (Association of Latin American 
Integration). The export tax is a substantial drag on production growth for exports. Some 
companies like Saputo did not expect the recent changes in the export tax, and they have 
suffered losses as a result.  
Impacts of the Economic Crisis on the Dairy Sector 
The 1990s was a period of fairly stable economic growth for Argentina. The dairy 
sector benefited from the attractive investment climate and increasing domestic incomes. 
Argentine milk production grew 60% during the period from 1992 to 1999, reaching 10.3 
mmt. However, the financial crises in Russia, Asia, and Brazil in late 1998 shook the 
confidence of Argentine consumers and international investors in the long-run stability of 
the Argentine economy. By the second half of 1998, Argentina was slipping into a 
recession that deepened over the next three years, culminating with the dissolution of the 
Argentine currency board and the government’s default on its debt. 
In 1999, consumer demand for dairy products was weakening, and international 
dairy prices were falling at double-digit rates, along with other major agricultural com-
modities. The record milk production in that year pushed the domestic processing sector 
to its capacity; consequently, farmgate milk prices dropped to $0.14/liter, roughly the 
level of production costs. Many producers were deep in debt from expanding their 
operations during the mid-1990s, and roughly 1,500 of the 19,000 dairy farms exited the 
industry in 1999. Processors were also stressed because the large retailers continued to 
demand long payment periods (usually 60 days), and retailers put pressure on processors 
to provide value and private label products. With returns from export sales declining and 
interest rates rising, domestic processors could no longer afford to invest in expanding 
capacity (Shull and Joseph, 1999). 
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Argentine milk output declined 4.8% in 2000 and an additional 3% in 2001. De-
spite declining production, farmgate milk prices continued to drop, averaging $0.13–
$0.15/liter in 2001. Argentina was losing competitiveness in international markets 
because of its overvalued currency, particularly with respect to Brazil, its biggest 
trading partner. Brazil’s 2001 imports of fluid milk from Argentina dropped 75% 
compared with 2000 levels, and imports of cheese and WMP declined 65% and 63%, 
respectively. Brazil also accused Argentina of dumping WMP on Brazilian markets, 
and a settlement was negotiated in 2001 that created a minimum import price for WMP 
from Argentina at $1,900/mt, further eroding Argentina’s export competitiveness. The 
Argentine government sought to offset some of the impacts of the peso’s peg to the 
dollar by giving processors a tax rebate of 6.8%–9% on exported products, but the 
rebates had little or no effect on export levels (Mergen and Joseph, 2000; Shull and 
Joseph, 2001). 
Declining profitability prompted an additional 3,000 dairy producers to exit the 
industry in 2000 and 2001. Many opted to sell their animals to more efficient produc-
ers and convert pastures to crop production. Soybeans were considerably more profit-
able than dairy because of their low input costs and improving international prices. 
Capacity utilization among the major dairy processors declined to 75%–80%, and 
losses led to consolidation and rationalization of productive capacity (Shull and 
Joseph, 2001). The crisis culminated in January 2002 with the dissolution of the 
currency board and the devaluation of the Argentine peso by 40%. One month later the 
peso was allowed to float, and by mid-2002 the peso was trading at 3.6 pesos/U.S. 
dollar, compared to its previous 1 peso to 1 U.S. dollar. The government attempted to 
put a lid on inflation by freezing prices for utilities and by limiting creditors’ rights. 
Moreover, private debts held in U.S. dollars were converted to pesos at the fixed rate 
of 1:1, pushing the cost of the devaluation off of individuals and private firms and onto 
the banking system (IMF, 2003).  
Agriculture benefited greatly from the devaluation because commodity prices, which 
were more closely tied to international prices, rose dramatically relative to input costs. This 
was particularly true for the crop sector. From 2001 to 2002, profitability of corn and 
soybeans jumped from $18/hectare and $106/hectare, respectively, to $218/hectare and 
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$224/ha. Milk net revenues also increased several-fold, increasing from $6/ha to $36/ha, 
but the higher cost of feed made dairying less attractive than crop production. Supplemental 
feeding, which had already declined substantially during the previous two years, was cut to 
a minimum; nevertheless, keeping alfalfa pastures generated high opportunity costs for 
dairy farmers (Kuss and Joseph, 2002). Farmers responded by culling 300,000 cows, 
reducing the national herd to 1992–1993 levels, and cutting milk production by 10%. 
Inventory reductions continued in 2003, culling another 150,000 animals, and milk produc-
tion fell to 7.9 mmt, 23% lower than the peak in 1999. 
Despite diminished milk supplies, Argentina’s exports of dairy products actually in-
creased in 2002 because the devaluation improved Argentina’s competitiveness on interna-
tional markets. Exports to Brazil improved somewhat, but the decline in Brazilian imports 
in the previous two years had forced Argentine exporters to expand sales in other regions, 
particularly Africa. Products were available for export because domestic consumption had 
collapsed following the devaluation. The milk equivalent of domestic per capita consump-
tion of dairy products fell to 170 kg in 2002, a decline of 26% from the pre-crisis peak 
levels. Weak domestic demand diminished the leverage available to large retailers, and the 
dairy processors were able to negotiate more favorable terms of exchange. After the 
devaluation, the government rolled back some of the incentives for exports by decreasing 
tax rebates to 3.4%–4.5% for most dairy products and by reinstating a 5% export tax on 
dairy products. 
While many participants in the dairy sector were devastated by the financial crisis, the 
industry that emerged from the crisis is in many respects stronger and more competitive 
than it was before the crisis. Milk production in 2006 is projected to reach the peak level of 
1999, but average productivity per cow is 16% higher than in 1999. The crisis forced less 
efficient and financially fragile producers out of the industry, and those that survived the 
crisis have been able to maintain profitability despite low milk prices. Likewise, the 
consolidation and rationalization of processing capacity that occurred during the crisis 
improved processing efficiency and prompted industry leaders to explore alliances with 
multinationals to increase export sales. 
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Positioning for Future Growth 
Comparative Advantage and Competitiveness in the Dairy Industry 
Comparative advantage is the ability of a nation (measured at the margin) to under-
take an activity at a lower cost, relative to the cost of other activities in the nation, than 
competing nations. From farm production to ocean freight to delivery at the final destina-
tion, there are many sources of comparative advantage or forces hindering international 
competitiveness—the ability to export. Lower unit cost of key inputs entering production 
is a major source of comparative advantage. The ability to adopt technology and quality 
control mechanisms to meet strict quality standards is another. Finally, export marketing 
channels and systems have to be in place to realize the export potential of producing 
goods at a low price. Entrepreneurs have to exist and be willing to take the risk associated 
with the export opportunities. Finally, government policies condition comparative 
advantage by altering input and output price incentives, and by influencing investment 
decisions with macroeconomic and fiscal policies. 
Sources of Competitiveness in Farming. Argentina has several critical components 
that contribute to its comparative advantage in milk production. First, feedstuffs are 
abundant and high quality. Feed costs are typically the largest component of variable 
production costs for livestock. The co-location of Argentina’s primary milk and cropping 
regions plays an important role in the low milk production cost in Argentina. Moreover, 
there is adequate land area to facilitate both crop production and improved pasture, 
without intense competition. Second, dairy farmers have access to and use high-quality 
genetic stock. Generally, the farmers producing the largest share of milk output are 
educated and possess or have access to the management systems and infrastructure 
needed to enable their animals to reach their productive potential. Third, Argentine dairy 
farms are capable of producing excellent-quality milk. They have the infrastructure on 
the farm (automated milking and on-farm cold storage) to preserve the quality of the milk 
and meet international standards for export. Pricing incentives are already in place to pay 
farmers for low bacteria counts, high fat, and high milk solid content. As the older, less 
market oriented operations continue to exit the industry, average productivity in the 
sector will rise and the efficiency of the sector as a whole will improve. 
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Sources of Competitiveness in the Processing Sector. Argentina has a competitive 
processing sector with large firms, such as Mastallone, SanCor, and Saputo, that have a 
clear export orientation. Many of the top firms have been involved with export markets for 
a long period of time and have been able to build some brand equity in foreign markets. 
Moreover, the connections between domestic firms and international partners, such as 
Nestlé, Fonterra, and Saputo, give the Argentine processors access to expanded marketing 
opportunities abroad. Finally, these processors have proven they have the ability to meet 
the demand of international consumers in terms of quality and product safety. 
Sources of Competitiveness in the Public Sector. The road infrastructure is excellent 
even in remote areas, and it is not saturated. This is in sharp contrast to Brazil and, to a 
lesser extent, Chile. The communication infrastructure seems more than adequate. The 
farms visited by the authors had computers with Internet access and kept computerized 
records to monitor individual animals. The phone infrastructure appears dependable and 
inexpensive. These good communication channels allow a price discovery mechanism 
and easy communication channels between the processors and farmers for sample test 
results and other marketing matters. 
Hindrances to Growth 
Macroeconomic Policy. The peso is projected to further devalue nominally against 
the U.S. dollar in the coming decade. However, this nominal devaluation of the peso 
could translate into a small real appreciation of the peso if annual inflation in Argentina 
relative to inflation in the United States is much stronger than the nominal devaluation 
against the U.S. dollar. If this occurs, competitiveness based on the massive nominal 
devaluation in recent years may not be long-lived, as inflation will eat away the initial 
gains from a weaker currency. In addition, the negotiated food price controls may prove 
to be a futile attempt to stop inflation and may only increase tensions between the gov-
ernment and industry. Finally, the squeeze on industry profits caused by the price freeze 
is compounded by recent mandatory 50% increase in wage rates in response to strikes in 
urban areas.  
Domestic Dairy and Trade Policies. The government of Argentina imposes signifi-
cant export taxes on dairy products, handicapping the industry. This is done to raise 
government revenues and lower the cost of food for urban constituencies. There are also 
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threats of further distortions by pushing the dairy industries into signing “agreements” 
with the government to freeze dairy product prices, effectively resulting in administered 
price controls. The price controls affect the farming sector because processors will lower 
raw milk prices to offset the lost sales revenue. In the short term, the price freeze may not 
have much effect because supply is not responsive in the short run. In the long run, 
supply will be inhibited by these distortions, both at the processing and farm levels 
because of the tax on returns.  
Before the crisis, the government refunded 3.5% of the VAT on dairy products when 
products were shipped out of the country. The government has stopped refunding the 
VAT. This change acts as a marginal increase in the export tax. The government could do 
much better in terms of targeting food security of the poor by providing targeted con-
sumption subsidies or dairy vouchers to the poor and unfreeze prices and reduce export 
taxes. In addition to this implicit export tax, the government charges an explicit export 
tax on most agricultural products. Table 1 displays the export tax rates on dairy products 
as of the fall of 2005. The government has a history of adjusting the export tax rate as 
international prices change, and this discretionary approach adds to the uncertainty of 
future profitability for dairy producers and processors, further inhibiting the sector’s 
growth potential. 
 
Table 1. Argentine export taxes on dairy products, fall 2005 
Commodity Export Tax Rate (%) 
Fluid milk (UHT) 15.0 
Whole dry milk (<2 Kg) 15.0 
Whole dry milk (>2 Kg) 15.0 
Nonfat dry milk (<2 Kg) 15.0 
Nonfat dry milk (>2 Kg) 15.0 
Soft cheese (<5 Kg) 10.0 
Hard cheese (>8 Kg) 10.0 
Source: Joseph, 2005. 
 
Trade Policies in Other Countries. Market access issues, mostly tariffs and TRQs 
were the primary barriers to Argentine dairy exports. Argentina exports milk powder to 
OPEC countries (Algeria, Iran, Iraq, and Nigeria), which tend to have relatively low 
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duties on powder. For example, Algeria applied a 5% duty on milk powder products. 
Subsidized products, primarily from the European Union, have some impact on their 
potential foreign sales because Argentine exports compete with EU exports. The progres-
sive elimination of EU export subsidies is likely to be part of a WTO Doha agreement. In 
some markets the European Union has preferential agreements with importers (e.g., 
Algeria) with preferential market access at a lower tariff rate or duty-free. If the elimination 
of export subsidies takes place, the potential for exports from competitive suppliers may be 
tremendous, not only for milk powder but also for butter and cheese products (hard cheese 
and soft cheese for food processing). The Argentine dairy industry views sanitary and 
phytosanitary issues as political barriers rather than as serious health-based concerns. 
Processors are confident they can meet quality standards of importers (Personal Communi-
cation with SanCor, 29 November 2005). 
 
Chile 
Country Overview 
Chile is a middle-income country with a 
population of approximately 15 million people 
located on the west coast of South America (see 
Figure 10). The Andes Mountains run down the 
entire length of Chile’s eastern border with 
Argentina. A desert forms Chile’s border with 
Peru in the north, and the Pacific Ocean lies on its 
western and southern borders. Chile is long and 
narrow, with a total land area of 756,950 square 
kilometers. Not surprisingly, Chile’s unique 
geographic characteristics provide a wide range of 
elevations and climatic conditions, enabling its 
farm sector to produce a number of horticultural 
crops, grains, livestock, and other agricultural 
commodities.  
Source: https://www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/geos/ci.html 
FIGURE 10. Map of Chile 
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The Chilean Economy 
Measured in terms of purchasing power parity, per capita income in Chile is about 
U.S.$9,000-$10,000. Recent GDP growth rates are between 4% and 6% annually (see 
Figure 11), and the country has enjoyed economic and political stability since the transi-
tion to civilian rule beginning in 1988 with the plebiscite that rejected continuation of 
military rule. Chile’s current constitution was adopted by plebiscite in 1980 (with signifi-
cant amendments in 1989, 1993, and 1997), and it places a premium on slow political 
change and a strong executive. 
The president serves a single term of six years, senators, eight years, and representa-
tives, four years. The government is unitary but broken into 12 regional administrative 
districts. The heads of the districts are appointed by the president, but local municipal 
governments have elected mayors and councils. 
The government is committed to an open economy, which has led to extremely low 
tariffs by international standards, increasing competitiveness in export-oriented and 
import-competing sectors and significant integration into world markets. Chile is a leader 
in establishing free trade agreements with various countries. Moreover, Chile is an 
associate member of the Mercosur regional trade agreement. Unemployment in Chile is 
currently 8%, which is very low by Latin American standards. 
 
Source: IMF, 2006 
FIGURE 11. Chile: annual and year-over-year GDP growth, 1995–2005 
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In addition to the political and economic stability of the country, the quality of the 
financial sector and the improving state of public infrastructure has resulted in Chile  
receiving high rankings as an investment target for the international business community. 
The Economist Intelligence Unit ranks Chile as the best country in Latin America for 
doing business and ranks it in 19th place out of a total of 60 countries considered. In 
comparison, Spain ranks 21st, Korea 26th , Japan 28th, Mexico 33rd, Brazil 37th, India 
43rd, and Argentina 47th. Chile is ranked 11th out of 155 economies by the Heritage 
Foundation’s Economic Freedom Rankings (2006) and 20th out of 127 by the Fraser 
Institute (Gwartney, Lawson, and Gartzke, 2005). Chile ranked 8th out of the 40 best 
destinations in the world in A.T. Kearney’s “2005 Offshore Location Attractiveness 
Index.” 
Monetary Policy and Taxation Environment. The Chilean Central Bank is formally 
and effectively independent of political decisions, and the Ministry of Finance, although 
politically directed, has been strongly pro-growth and tight money. Inflation rates have 
been about 1%-2% most recently (see Figure 12), and foreign exchange reserves are high. 
The value of Chile’s currency floats, however, and because of the fluctuation of export  
 
 
Source: IMF, 2006 
FIGURE 12. Chile: consumer (CPI) and wholesale price (WPI) inflation rates, 1995–2005 
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values (mainly copper) and the decisions of the U.S. monetary authorities, exchange rates 
have been highly variable. Recently, the value of the dollar against the Chilean peso has 
been extremely weak (see Figure 13), which has put Chile’s agricultural exports at a 
disadvantage in U.S. markets and against U.S. exporters. 
Almost all laws, especially with regard to taxes and regulations, are determined cen-
trally and apply equally throughout Chile. There are household and corporate income 
taxes and property taxes, which are fairly uncomplicated by U.S. standards, but the 
country does have a significant VAT of 19%. Corporate taxes are straightforward. They 
are currently based on a 17% levy on accrued income, and a 35% tax on profits distrib-
uted to shareholders, partners, or foreign parent companies. (The 17% initial tax on 
accrued income acts as a credit on this 35% profit tax.) Foreign companies investing 
more that U.S.$50 million can opt for a guaranteed 42% fixed rate for 20 years (10 years 
for investments less than U.S.$50 million), or the currently more remunerative general 
tax scheme just described, but without guarantees. 
 
 
Source: IMF, 2006 
FIGURE 13. Chilean exchange rate, Chilean pesos per U.S. dollar, 1995–2006 
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Sovereign Risk. The country’s long-term sovereign rating was increased by Fitch 
Ratings from A- to A, and that agency reports that Chile’s fiscal surplus “demonstrates 
that Chile’s structural fiscal balance rule is working, allowing the government to pay 
down debt during periods of faster growth while leaving space for some counter-cyclical 
easing when the economy slows” (Fitch Ratings, 2006). The increased rating was also the 
result of the breadth and strength of the export sector. Although copper exports and high 
international prices have tended to put upward pressure on the currency, non-copper 
exports—including agricultural products—increased 23% in 2004. External debt relative 
to exports has fallen to its lowest level in 10 years. Moody’s index of financial strength 
for December 2004 ranked Chile above Germany, Mexico, Brazil, Japan, and China (in 
that order). JP Morgan Chase reports (in Emerging Markets Bond Index, available at 
www.morganmarkets.com) that Chile’s sovereign spread average in 2005 was 65 basis 
points, which can be compared to the European average for the same year of 185, and to 
that of Latin America as a whole of 364. 
The system of managing public finances has contributed to the maintenance of lower 
and more stable financing costs in domestic and foreign capital markets. The government 
has remained committed to its surplus fiscal rule, and this has enhanced the credibility 
among investors of the country’s public finances. It has led to reduced interest rates 
through lower country risk ratings and enhanced flexibility for private sector financing. 
The management of the fiscal surplus has had a positive impact on how international 
markets perceive the soundness of public finances, as has been demonstrated in risk 
rating agencies’ reports. Chile’s sovereign debt risk premium has varied around the 
historically low levels of around 70 basis points. 
Access to external financing is very favorable, despite the recent increases in short- 
and long-term international interest rates. During the second half of 2005 the risk rating 
on sovereign bonds rose slightly compared to the first half (8 basis points), but the 
corporate premium fell (30 basis points) during the same period. Nevertheless, domestic 
firms preferred domestic financing during the last year. Codelco issued the only foreign 
bond in 2005, in September of that year. 
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Trading Strategy 
It was noted earlier that Chile has actively pursued a strategy of trade liberalization 
in both bilateral and multilateral contexts. The objective of this strategy is to increase the 
pace of economic growth and development by reducing the barriers faced by Chilean 
export products with a comparative advantage on international markets and the cost of 
imported goods, for which Chile does not have a comparative advantage. The open 
market policy also promotes increased efficiency by exposing domestic industries to 
competition from the top international producers. Moreover, the economic stability and 
attractiveness to foreign investors facilitates rapid technology transfer through direct 
investment and joint ventures with international firms, providing dynamics in cost 
advantages.  
Traditionally, Chile’s primary import suppliers for many products have been 
neighboring countries such as Argentina and Brazil. With new trade agreements being 
negotiated and existing agreements being expanded, it is expected that other Latin 
American countries will increase their shares of Chile’s import market. Chile’s main 
export markets regionally are Asia (30%), the EU countries (26%), NAFTA (22.5%), and 
Mercosur (9.5%). The largest single export market for Chile is still the United States, 
which purchases 17% of Chile’s total exports. Figure 14 shows the composition of 
Chilean exports in 2004.  
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FIGURE 14. Composition of Chilean exports in 2004 
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Agricultural Sector 
Over the last two decades, Chilean agriculture has shown remarkable growth; both in 
terms of total value and in terms of productivity. Agricultural GDP grew about 5% 
annually on average during the 1990s, and lately this rate has accelerated. More impor-
tantly, agricultural export growth is double that of GDP growth, approximately 10% to 
12% annually. At present, agriculture directly contributes about 4% to 5% of national 
GDP but nearly 25% of export earnings. Copper is still the single largest source of export 
earnings. Approximately 33.8% of the workforce is employed in the agricultural sector. 
Around 5% of the land in Chile is used for farming, and another 18% consists of perma-
nent pastures. While the Central Valley in Chile is dominated by export-oriented horticul-
tural activity, the South is mainly used for aquaculture, beef, sheep farming, and dairy.  
The climate of Chile favors an evolution of the agricultural sector toward what is ob-
served on the West Coast of the United States and Canada (between Baja California and 
the fjords of British Colombia). Growth in the agricultural sector, which in recent years 
has been faster than the overall economy, has been primarily attributable to growth in 
fresh and processed fruit, wine, dairy and forestry products. Nevertheless, productivity in 
cereal production is quite high, although there are still tens of thousands of poor, small 
farmers, typically growing wheat or other cereals. The transition toward a completely 
commercial agriculture such as that in the United States will likely take at least a genera-
tion. The Central Valley of Chile, where most of the high-valued fruit and wine are 
produced, is temperate, with dry summers, good irrigation, and with rare occurrences of 
droughts or hail. The fruit and horticulture sector is highly sophisticated; production, 
processing and marketing practices are oriented to the those in the United States and 
European Union. Sanitary and phytosanitary practices (even labor practices) go beyond 
governmental regulations and aim to please supermarket chains in the developed world, 
especially in Britain and the United States. 
As one moves south, the climate becomes wetter, cereal production takes place, and 
the grasslands and pasture make livestock, primarily beef and dairy, particularly profit-
able. The agricultural sector in southern Chile has been most affected by the establish-
ment of various free trade agreements because its agricultural system for wheat, sugar 
beets, and other grains is not as efficient as it is in other countries. Chile uses its universi-
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ties and technological centers to adapt to these pressures. Of the cereals grown in this 
region, corn production will likely remain stable, and any growth in demand will be 
satisfied by increased imports. Wheat producers are currently under pressure from cheap 
Argentine flour imports, and it is possible that wheat area may decline. Contract seed 
production is increasing rapidly. However, rice is likely the only field crop with a dy-
namic future, being grown in areas similar to California’s Sacramento River region.  
The Dairy Industry 
While fruits, vegetables, and wine are the major agricultural exports, there has been 
significant growth in the dairy industry and dairy exports as well in recent years. The 
dairy industry is a sector targeted as a potential key export in the future. In 2003, the 
value of Chile’s dairy product exports was U.S.$55 million; however, in only the first 
five months of 2005 the value of dairy exports had already exceeded that amount. Figure 
15 shows the increase in value of dairy exports. Imports of dairy products have declined 
by over 100% since 2000 while exports have also grown by more than 100% during this 
same period.  
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FIGURE 15. Chilean dairy exports over the 2003-2005 (first five months only) period 
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Figure 16 shows that cheese is the principal export, followed by condensed milk and milk 
powder. The main export market for these products is Mexico, which accounts for almost 
65% of all dairy exports, followed by Cuba (9%), Costa Rica (7%), and other South 
American countries (Figure 17). For its exports, Chile focuses on countries with which it 
has trade agreements. Mexico signed a free trade agreement in 2002, and cheese repre-
sents a significant part of its dairy imports from Chile. Chile has become the largest 
exporter of hard cheeses to Mexico, shipping roughly 18,000 mt of cheese annually under 
its preferential agreement.  
The main production sector in Chile is the 10th Region, Los Lagos (see Figure 18). 
Puerto Montt is the administrative capital of the 10th Region. This area has a great deal 
of pasture and is ideally situated with regard to temperature and climate for dairy produc-
tion. In 2004, roughly 70% of Chile’s milk was produced in the 10th Region. However, 
the bulk of Chile’s population and demand for dairy products is further north in the 
Santiago area. Consequently, the bulk of the milk produced in the 10th Region is proc-
essed for transport north as powered milk or shipped to export destinations. Thus, the 
10th Region is the location with the greatest growth potential for dairy production in 
Chile and the primary source for growth in dairy product exports. 
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FIGURE 16. Composition of Chilean dairy exports in 2004 
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FIGURE 17. Chile’s main trade partners for dairy products in 2004 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:ChileRegionLagos.png 
FIGURE 18. Chile’s 10th Region 
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Transformation from Net Importer to Net Exporter 
Although the dairy sector is targeted for export growth, Chile has been historically a 
small net importer of dairy products. Since 1993, the milk equivalent of Chile’s net 
imports of dairy products has trended downward. Figure 19 shows milk production and 
the milk equivalent of net imports and per capita dairy consumption. Milk consumption 
per capita in Chile has been relatively stagnant since the early 1990s, while milk produc-
tion has continued to trend upward. The growing supply of milk has enabled a substantial 
degree of import substitution, particularly for cheese and WMP. During this same period, 
Chile aggressively pursued its open market strategy, creating new export opportunities 
for dairy products. Chile’s exports of cheese and WMP have grown steadily since 2000. 
Figure 20 shows Chile’s monthly dairy trade since January 2001. Chile moved back and 
forth from a net importer to a net exporter of dairy products throughout 2002 and 2003, 
but it became a clear net exporter in 2004.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 19. Milk production, net imports, and consumption per capita in milk 
equivalent 
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FIGURE 20. Monthly dairy product imports and exports in milk equivalent liters 
 
Decline in Milk Prices and Shift in Industry Perspective. As a country transitions 
from a net importer of a product to a net exporter, the domestic price for the product 
should decline from the world price plus tariffs and transportation costs to the world 
price. Figure 21 shows the evolution of milk prices in the 10th Region. For comparison, 
the FOB northern European nonfat dry milk powder (NFD) and WMP prices have been 
converted to a milk equivalent price and displayed in the graph. All three prices are 
weighted averages of monthly prices, where the weights are the monthly production 
shares for the region. It is interesting to note that prior to 2000, the milk price in the 10th 
Region was close to the milk equivalent price of WMP, the higher of the two interna-
tional prices. In 2000, international milk powder prices rose sharply, but the milk price in 
Chile did not fully reflect this price change. Likewise, in 2001, Chilean milk prices fell 
while international powder prices rose. Thus, in those two years, milk prices in Chile 
adjusted downward to a new level relative to international dairy prices. Since 2001, the 
milk price in Chile’s 10th Region appears to have moved closely with international 
prices, but the relative price has remained at the lower 2001 level. According to ODEPA 
(Chile’s Ministry of Agriculture), the realignment of milk prices was prompted by 
inexpensive imports from Argentina; thus, the open border policy that Chile has been 
pursuing is forcing its dairy producers to become competitive at international prices. 
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FIGURE 21. Chilean milk price in the 10th Region and the milk equivalent prices of 
NFD and WMP on world markets 
 
Government Policy Response. This realignment of milk prices did not go unnoticed 
by Chile’s dairy producers. Since 2001, the government has been talking to the dairy 
industry’s export federation, Fedeleche, about how to improve the competitiveness of the 
Chilean dairy sector. Both government and industry participants believe that Chile’s milk 
production will continue to grow at an average of 6% annually for a number of years, 
facilitating increased dairy export growth. To capitalize on this opportunity, the govern-
ment and industry agreed on a set of 15 measures embodied in the 2003 Dairy Accord. 
The provisions of the Dairy Accord focus heavily on milk pricing and protection of milk 
producers from opportunistic behavior on the part of dairy processors. Key components 
of the accord include increased transparency in pricing formulas, premium-based pricing, 
improvements in technical efficiency, provision of statistics, and the development of a 
seasonal production component. 
In accordance with the new price transparency policies and provision of statistical 
information, ODEPA set up a Web site that publishes export prices, milk prices, product 
production, product values, and stocks. In addition to facilitating marketing decisions, the 
pricing information is intended to reduce the distrust between producers and processors 
that has developed in recent years. Policies intended to improve technical efficiency 
include the soil reconditioning program and assistance in constructing irrigation systems. 
There is also some funding for export promotion activities. 
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Major Firms Operating in Chile’s Dairy Industry 
In 2004, the top four firms—Soprole, Nestlé, Colún, and Loncoleche—processed 
75% of the milk collected in Chile. In the first 10 months of 2005, Loncoleche’s process-
ing volume was 10% lower than in 2004, but the other three firms posted increases of 
1.2%–8.4%. Soprole, Chile’s largest processor, handles roughly 24% of milk production 
in Chile and showed the largest increase in milk production in 2005. Nestlé is the second-
largest processor with 19.3% of the market, but Colún Cooperativa is gaining ground and 
may soon overtake Nestlé. Figure 22 shows the market share changes over time for milk 
produced in the 10th Region. 
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FIGURE 22. Milk reception volumes by firm in Chile’s 10th Region 
 
Soprole. Soprole is a Chilean-based company that was founded in 1948 as a pro-
ducer cooperative in the Santiago area. At that time it manufactured pasteurized milk, 
fresh cheeses, and butter, concentrating its sales in Santiago. Since then, Soprole has 
undergone many changes that have made the company a leader in Chile’s dairy market. 
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Soprole has 75%–80% of the dairy market in Santiago, but it has expanded its operations 
to other parts of the country. The New Zealand Dairy Board purchased a majority share 
in Soprole in 1993, and the company is now a member of the Fonterra group, the succes-
sor to the Dairy Board. In 2000, Soprole decided to centralize the administration, distri-
bution, and commercialization of all the Soprole brand products. Soprole’s vision is to 
provide the most inexpensive products with the best logistics and also increasingly 
concentrate on value-added products. Soprole employs more than 3,000 workers in four 
plants within Chile and uses advanced technology that contributes to a milk reception 
capacity of over 380 million liters per year. Soprole just announced plans to build a milk 
drying plant in Orsorno in March 2006. 
Careful examination of Figure 22 reveals that Soprole, while the largest processor 
nationally, is not the largest processor in the 10th Region. Roughly half of Soprole’s 
processing capacity is located in Santiago and the other dairy producing regions north of 
the 10th Region. Fonterra has indicated that it would like to make Soprole a significant 
player in international dairy markets, and expanding processing capacity for exports is 
most profitable in the 10th Region. However, recent events have created some ill-will 
between Soprole and the small dairy farmers in the 10th Region. In particular, two events 
in recent years have raised suspicions about the Fonterra’s intentions. First, Fonterra 
attempted to merge Soprole with Dairy Partners of America (DPA), its joint venture with 
Nestlé. Approval of the merger was blocked by the Isabel Aninat Foundation, a charitable 
trust administered by the Catholic Church and owner of 43% of the company’s shares at 
the time of the merger attempt. Had the merger gone through, the DPA joint venture 
would have placed roughly 40% of the country’s milk resources in the hands of one 
company, and producers and other industry participants were concerned about the im-
pacts on milk prices (Astaburuaga, 2005). Since 2002, Fonterra has gradually increased 
its holdings in Saprole, and it is still seeking to merge Soprole into the DPA at some point 
in the future (Fox, 2005).  
The second event that cast suspicions on the intentions of New Zealand investments 
in the dairy industry was the negotiation and eventual conclusion of the free trade agree-
ment with New Zealand and Singapore. The agreement opens Chile’s dairy markets to 
duty-free imports over a 10-year period. The very gradual reduction in tariffs was negoti-
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ated by Chilean dairy interests in hopes that the sector could be protected during this time 
of transition from net importer to net exporter. The concern on the part of some constitu-
ents in Chile’s dairy industry was that cheap imports from New Zealand would lower 
domestic prices and put small farmers out of business. Soprole has an active producer 
education effort underway to alleviate concerns about the company’s objectives and to 
promote more efficient production practices in the 10th Region. 
Nestlé Chile. Historically, Nestlé has focused on the marketing activities of its prod-
ucts in its foreign market operations. Nestlé’s Chilean dairy operations are unique in that 
they involve both procurement and processing. Nestlé has operated in Chile since 1934, 
but it entered the fluid milk market in 1993 with its purchase of Milkmaid of the South. 
Currently, Nestlé owns eight centers of production in Chile that produce yogurt, milk 
powder, and a wide variety of other dairy products targeting the needs of markets in Chile 
and many foreign countries.  
In past years, the number of products made by Nestlé Chile that trade internationally 
has greatly increased. Nestlé’s main South American markets are Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. The statistics show the increase in foreign trade 
from 1993, when 9,000 tons of products (fluid milk equivalent) were exported to seven 
countries, to 2002, when 19,000 tons were exported to 17 countries. This shows the great 
trading capacity of Nestlé Chile in foreign markets. 
Colún Cooperativa. At present, Colún Cooperativa has 1,300 workers. This organiza-
tion is currently the largest dairy products manufacturer in the 10th Region, producing an 
extensive range of products such as different types of cheeses, butter, fluid milk, and 
special delicacy products (manjar). Colún’s processing facilities are centralized in one 
location in La Union in the 10th Region. The Colún Cooperativa also provides various 
services to its associate members. These include programs of technical support in general 
agronomy, help to small dairy producers, veterinary support, and artificial insemination 
services. The organization has also ensured improvement in the quality of milk through 
its dairy inspection system, by installing milk parlors, and by expanding the use of 
refrigerated on-farm storage. Colún has formed alliances among cooperatives and milk 
producers in Chile, which has given it great market strength in the southern part of Chile. 
Producers in the 10th Region have a very favorable opinion of Colún, in part because of 
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its history in the region but also because of the perception that the milk prices and assis-
tance offered by Colún is superior to those of other firms in the region (Personal Com-
munication with German Stolzenbach, 3 December 2005). 
Positioning for Future Growth 
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Chile’s dairy industry is in a period of 
transition, and the future growth of milk production and exports depends on the agree-
ment over the direction of change and exuberance with which different segments of the 
industry embrace the changes. A central point of disagreement among producers and 
processors in the 10th Region is whether seasonal or non-seasonal production and pricing 
systems will best stimulate growth and yield the greatest benefits to both producers and 
processors. The New Zealand dairy industry has excelled at developing production 
techniques and the necessary infrastructure to make the seasonal production model 
profitable for both sides of the milk market. Given the climatic and geographic similari-
ties between New Zealand and Chile’s 10th Region, it is not surprising that Soprole is 
advocating the adoption of seasonal production and component-based pricing of its milk 
for its southern operations. In fact, Chile’s 10th Region has slightly more rainfall and a 
longer growing season than does New Zealand. 
However, Chile’s dairy sector has been oriented toward non-seasonal production 
for decades to provide a steady supply of milk and dairy products to Santiago and other 
population centers. The importance of the Santiago market is reflected in the pricing 
practices used in the 10th Region. Prices are typically set according to the cost of milk 
production in the Santiago area less transportation costs. Moreover, producers can be 
paid as much as a 50% premium for winter milk over prices during the peak production 
season. Thus, there are strong price incentives for dairy farms to continue with the non-
seasonal production model. The problem with the non-seasonal model for Chile as a 
dairy exporter is that it does not efficiently utilize the pasture resources of southern 
Chile, and it is more costly because of the substantial amounts of supplemental (often 
imported) grains that must be fed to produce milk when pastures are less productive. 
Therefore, it will be more difficult for Chile to be competitive on international markets 
over the long run. 
40 / Fuller et al. 
Costs and Benefits of Seasonal Production  
The idea behind seasonally oriented milk production is to maximize milk production 
during the time when pastures are most productive, thereby lowering the cost of feed 
inputs and the unit cost of milk production. Effective seasonal production requires milk 
producers to impregnate their cows during a narrow 60-day window between October and 
December. This enables the cows to calve in the spring (July and August) when pastures 
are increasing their output (see Figure 23), and both pastures and cows reach peak 
production at roughly the same time. As pasture productivity declines in the late summer 
cows are gradually dried off, beginning with the pregnant cows and least productive 
cows. When pastures are their least productive, the cows are not milked at all, giving 
producers a break from the daily chore of milking. Under seasonal production systems, 
the average lactation period runs between 255 and 300 days (Agritech, 2003; Ely, 2003). 
Consequently, seasonal dairy production implies seasonal income for milk producers, 
which requires careful budgeting and asset management by the farm household.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 23. Energy and milk solids production per hectare of pasture in the Orsorno 
and Puerto Montt areas 
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Because cattle obtain the vast majority of their nutrients from the pasture under a seasonal 
system, milk yields tend to be lower than with more intensive feeding regimes. Average 
yields in New Zealand were 3,627 liters/cow from 2002 to 2004, while yields in the United 
States averaged 8,252 liters/cow. The advantage of seasonal production shows in the lower 
cost structure relative to non-seasonal production methods. Table 2 shows the estimated 
cost of producing milk in Chile’s 10th Region for both seasonal and non-seasonal produc-
ers based on data gathered by researchers at the Católica University in Santiago. Direct and 
total economic unit costs for seasonal production are more than 20% lower than for non-
seasonal production. The greatest savings are achieved in supplemental feed costs and 
labor. Capital costs are also frequently lower because cattle are not housed during 
 
TABLE 2. Estimated cost of production in the 10th Region by production system 
 
Units Seasonal 
Production 
Non-seasonal 
Production 
Costs   
Direct $/Hectoliter 10.5 13.8 
Total (excluding land) $/Hectoliter 12.4 19.1 
Total economic  $/Hectoliter 15.9 20.4 
Total economic  $/100 kg milk solids 226.0 288.0 
Return over land  Percent 8.0 4.0 
Cash flow  $/Hectare 376.0 376.0 
Total Investment  1,000 $ 461.3 841.2 
Farm Characteristics    
Number of cows Head 133 205 
Pasture area Hectares 88 128 
Stocking density Cows/hectare 1.5 2.0 
Supplemental feeding Percent by weight 8.0 29.0 
Total production    
Fluid milk Hectoliters 6642.0 13,420.0 
Milk solids Metric tons 46.8 95.3 
Seasonal index (summer/winter) Index 3.1 1.4 
Yields     
Fluid milk  Hectoliters/hectare 75.5 104.9 
Milk solids Kilograms/hectare 532 745 
Source: Mac Cawley, 2005. 
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lactation. Cash flow on a per hectare basis is the same, as shown in Table 2, but this is not 
an unusual finding (see Groover, 2000). The important point is that with lower production 
costs, equal revenue per hectare implies that the residual rate of return for seasonal produc-
ers is double that of non-seasonal producers. 
Despite the economic incentives for switching to seasonal production, there are several 
factors hindering the transition. First, changing to a seasonal production system requires 
substantial investments by individual dairy farmers. Some capital investment is required to 
purchase a bulk tank that is sufficiently large to handle the milk volumes generated at peak 
production levels. Depending on the  herd structure and feeding practices prior to the 
change, producers will most likely have to gradually adjust their herds’ genetic stock to 
breeds that are more productive on pasture rations (such as Jersey and Black Frisk). The 
producers will also need to aggressively cull animals that have difficulty getting pregnant 
because of the narrow time window for calving. Finally, seasonal producers have to invest 
in improving the quality of their pastures, fencing, and watering systems to employ rota-
tional pasture management techniques that maximize productivity. Both the financial and 
educational investments needed to adopt seasonal dairying are major disincentives for 
many dairy producers who are in their fifties, a group that accounts for a large segment of 
the dairy farmers in Chile’s 10th Region.  
Second, the industry in Chile currently lacks the financial and support services re-
quired to make seasonal production sustainable. In particular, farmers have difficulties 
securing financing for investments and for working capital. Saprole is attempting to address 
this issue by offering producers contracts that it hopes banks will accept as collateral for 
loans. So far, the contracts have received a lukewarm reception from the banking sector. 
Likewise, the local insemination, veterinary, and contract labor systems needed to effi-
ciently manage a seasonal dairy operation are currently not in place. In New Zealand, a 
well-structured system of contract labor, share-milkers, and independent farmers has 
developed to enable new producers to enter and older producers to exit. 
Third, milk processors currently do not have the capacity to handle a significant move 
toward seasonal production. Processors need to have the ability to handle the large supply 
of milk that comes during the summer months. In addition, developing that capacity 
implies that they will have considerable excess capacity during the off season. Ely (2003) 
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estimates that the average capacity utilization for dairy processors in New Zealand is 70%. 
While both Colún and Saprole are expanding their processing capacity in the 10th Region, 
these investments are partly a reflection of the fact that they are struggling to handle the 
current milk production volume during the summer months.  
International Market Opportunities 
Regardless of the pace of developments on the production side, Chile’s pursuit of free 
trade agreements will open doors for Chile’s dairy industry in foreign markets. Since 1996, 
Chile has been a signatory on nine free trade agreements (FTA), including agreements with 
China, Korea, Mexico, the European Union, and the United States. Perhaps the most 
beneficial agreement for the dairy sector to date is the agreement with Mexico. Chile has 
become the largest exporter of hard cheeses to Mexico, shipping roughly 18,000 mt of 
cheese annually under its preferential agreement. The agreement with China in 2005 is 
expected to lead to an increase in China’s imports of Chilean whey powder imports in the 
near term. At the time of our visit to Chile, Colún Cooperativa had a new milk drier under 
construction that was intended to increase its capacity to dry whey for export. Cheese 
imports from Chile will enter China duty free after five years. The U.S.-Chile agreement 
opens U.S. dairy markets to Chilean imports over a 12-year period by gradually expanding 
duty-free access for dairy products. In the 12th year of the implementation period, all dairy 
products from Chile will enter the United States without tariffs. While the short-term access 
to U.S. markets is quite limited, establishing a foothold in the market may create much 
greater opportunities when full liberalization is complete. The Chilean government also 
anticipates that the preferential agreements already negotiated or under negotiation with its 
neighbors in South America will increase export opportunities for the dairy sector as the 
agreements are implemented. 
The FTA with New Zealand concluded in 2005 is not expected to increase Chile’s ex-
ports of dairy products to New Zealand; rather, Chile’s market will be gradually opened to 
imports from New Zealand over a 12-year period. By providing duty-free access to a low-
cost producer, such as New Zealand, the Chilean government is creating market incentives 
for the domestic industry to remain internationally competitive. With the expectation that a 
new agreement in the Doha Round of negotiations in the WTO will include the elimination 
of export subsidies, dairy producers that are internationally competitive stand to gain 
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substantially with the reduction in exports from the European Union. So, while this strategy 
has raised concerns on the part of small milk producers and processors in Chile, and 
perhaps rightfully so, it improves the overall industry’s potential for capitalizing on devel-
opments in multilateral trade negotiations. 
Attractive International Investment Location 
In contrast to many other Latin American countries, Chile is a safe and profitable in-
vestment location. The significant and continued presence of Nestlé and Fonterra in Chile 
speaks to the potential that exists for dairy production, particularly in the 10th Region. 
While involvement of large, multinational firms can put downward pressure on industry 
cost structure and promote a general increase in production scale, particularly in low- and 
middle-income countries, the competition they provide to domestic firms can accelerate the 
rate of technology adoption. Moreover, the infusion of international funds increases the rate 
of structural change in the industry. Chile’s dairy industry has already experienced signifi-
cant technological change, both in primary production and in processing, as a result of 
opening markets to foreign investment and competition (Faiguenbaum, Berdegué, and 
Reardon, 2002). As the industry moves forward, investments from Fonterra and others will 
likely continue to be a driving force in the adoption of better production and management 
practices at the farm level. 
Industry Challenges  
A number of challenges facing development of Chile’s dairy industry were mentioned 
in the discussion of seasonal production. In particular, the financial sector does not provide 
adequate support and services for the producers to make the investments needed to modern-
ize at the farm level. Another challenge faced at the farm level is the aging demographic of 
Chile’s dairy farmers. The current institutional structures make it difficult for the younger 
generation to begin new dairy operations. Moreover, many young people in rural areas 
migrate to urban centers for employment. These institutional and financial systems will 
need to change and develop to facilitate the growth and technological transformation 
required for Chile to become more than a marginal exporter of dairy products. 
The sector’s historical focus on domestic markets presents challenges at the processor 
level, as well as at the farm level. In particular, the lack of excess capacity will inhibit 
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Chile’s ability to service foreign markets, even if the demand exists. Currently, foreign 
consumers are largely unfamiliar with Chilean dairy products. The Chilean fruit and wine 
industries have been very successful at promoting Chilean products in foreign markets. The 
government hopes to build on Chile’s reputation in food markets by providing up to $10 
million for market promotion activities targeted toward dairy products. The desire is to 
improve consumer awareness and appreciation of the quality of Chilean dairy products in 
foreign markets, and the program is implemented in cooperation with the domestic dairy 
industry. One final hindrance to the growth in Chile’s dairy exports is the strong value of 
the peso relative to the U.S. dollar. This is most relevant, as Chilean exporters seek to enter 
the U.S. market. However, Chilean exporters may also see stiffer competition in countries 
where the U.S. dairy industry is active, particularly in milk powder and whey markets. 
 
Looking Forward 
In previous sections, the potential growth of dairy production and exports in Chile 
and Argentina was discussed in the context of current economic and geopolitical condi-
tions. However, as the Doha Round of negotiations draws closer to an agreement, it is 
worthwhile to consider how Argentina and Chile are likely to fare in a more liberalized 
trading regime. In order to estimate the impacts of trade liberalization on dairy produc-
tion, consumption, and trade in Chile and Argentina, we conducted two simulations using 
the CARD International Dairy Model (CIDM). The scenarios focus on two of the three 
pillars of the WTO negotiations on agriculture, namely, export subsidies and market 
access. The remainder of this section briefly describes the CIDM and the baseline projec-
tions for Argentine and Chilean dairy sectors. The baseline summary is followed by a 
description of the scenario assumptions and a brief presentation of the key results. Only 
selected results are presented in this report, but some additional tables are provided in the 
appendices. 
The CARD International Dairy Model Baseline  
The CIDM is a multi-market, partial equilibrium model of international dairy mar-
kets. The model was developed to analyze the impacts of domestic and trade policy 
changes on international prices, production, consumption, and trade volumes for butter, 
cheese, NFD and WMP. The model is a close relative to the Food and Agricultural 
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Policy Research Institute’s (FAPRI) international dairy model. The key differences 
between the two models lie in the modeling platform, countries covered, and in some 
individual country model characteristics and parameters. For more information about 
the FAPRI international dairy model, visit http://www.fapri.iastate.edu/models/ 
dairy.aspx.  
In order to measure the impacts of trade liberalization, a baseline projection under 
current policies must be established as a point of comparison. We use the FAPRI 
baseline projections (FAPRI, 2006) for the dairy products covered in the CIDM. The 
baseline formalizes expert opinion and assumptions on major drivers in dairy and 
related markets in a consistent fashion. The macroeconomic and policy assumptions 
underlying their projections are published on the FAPRI web site, which interested 
readers should consult for the complete set of baseline assumptions and tables. As the 
FAPRI baseline does not include Chile in its 2006 outlook, so projections for the 
Chilean dairy sector and other missing countries were created using the FAPRI baseline 
international dairy prices and exchange rate and GDP growth projections obtained from 
Global Insight. The additional countries in the CIDM were disaggregated from the 
original rest-of-the-world in the original FAPRI baseline. The net result is that total 
traded volumes in the CIDM are identical to the FAPRI baseline. Table 3 summarizes 
the baseline results for Argentina and Chile. 
In the FAPRI baseline, international dairy product prices gradually rise in nominal 
terms, but real dairy prices slowly decline at an average rate of 0.8% per year. Profit-
ability of dairy production remains stable over the projection period and increases 
slightly in the latter half. This is possible because productivity in Argentina and Chile is 
expected to increase annually 1.1% and 1.5%, respectively. Moreover, real feed prices 
decline relative to dairy prices over the long term. Argentina’s dairy cattle inventory 
increases 29% from 2006 to 2015, creating an additional 3.75 mmt of milk. 
Less than 20% of the growth in milk production in Argentina is consumed domesti-
cally as fluid products. The remaining 80% is processed into other products, with more 
than 60% converted into cheese. Additional WMP production accounts for about 16% of 
the increase in factory milk. Roughly 50% of the increase in WMP is exported, while 
only 25% of the cheese is shipped to other countries.  
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TABLE 3. Baseline projections for Argentine and Chilean dairy sectors 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
International Prices U.S. Dollars per Metric Ton 
Butter 1,755 1,803 1,853 1,849 1,860 1,891 1,920 1,946 1,972 1,992 
Cheese 2,689 2,749 2,842 2,851 2,860 2,905 2,948 2,976 3,001 3,017 
NFD 1,983 2,040 2,101 2,131 2,134 2,146 2,154 2,158 2,160 2,163 
WMP 2,069 2,132 2,233 2,245 2,243 2,282 2,303 2,318 2,339 2,344 
Cow Inventories Thousand Head 
Argentina 2,149 2,197 2,246 2,294 2,343 2,394 2,448 2,503 2,560 2,618 
Chile 627 633 638 643 649 653 659 668 677 688 
Milk Production Million Metric Tons 
Argentina 10.30 10.67 11.03 11.42 11.81 12.22 12.66 13.11 13.57 14.05 
Chile 2.38 2.43 2.48 2.55 2.61 2.67 2.75 2.83 2.92 3.02 
Argentine Net Exports Thousand Metric Tons 
Butter 5.0 5.2 5.4 5.4 5.8 6.2 6.8 7.5 8.2 9.0 
Cheese 63.5 65.9 66.6 68.0 73.5 82.1 91.6 101.0 110.4 119.5 
NFD 22.2 24.5 26.4 28.3 30.2 32.0 34.1 36.4 38.7 41.3 
WMP 184.9 189.5 195.4 200.0 199.8 202.4 205.1 208.3 212.5 216.3 
Chilean Net Exports           
Buttera -1.4 -1.3 -1.3 -1.2 -1.3 -1.5 -1.6 -1.7 -1.7 -1.7 
Cheese 10.5 7.6 8.5 9.4 10.6 11.6 12.5 13.8 15.5 17.5 
NFDa -3.7 -4.6 -4.5 -4.2 -4.0 -3.9 -3.9 -3.8 -3.5 -3.2 
WMP 6.0 9.6 13.5 15.7 17.6 19.9 23.3 27.2 31.3 35.7 
a Negative numbers denote net imports. 
 
Chile’s dairy herd is projected to increase more gradually, rising less than 1% per 
year. Milk production increases 27%, with roughly 80% of the growth used for manufac-
tured products. Additional cheese production accounts for 43% of the growth in factory 
milk, and WMP absorbs 36% of the increase. All of the additional WMP production is 
destined for export markets, representing a sixfold increase in Chile’s WMP exports over 
the period. Roughly 30% of the growth in cheese production is exported. These are fairly 
conservative projections for Chile, and they do not embody a major shift toward an 
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export orientation in Chile’s southern production region. A concerted effort to adopt an 
aggressive growth strategy in the region could possibly double the production growth 
contained in our baseline projections. While this is a distinct possibility, our impression 
from our brief time in Chile was that the transformation in the region was proceeding 
only gradually. 
Scenario 1: Exports Subsidy and Export Tax Elimination  
The first scenario focuses on the elimination of export subsidies and export taxes. 
Similar to the U.S. proposal submitted to the WTO in the fall of 2005, we assume that 
export subsidies are eliminated in four equal increments starting in 2007 and ending in 
2010. In addition, we assume that Argentina removes its export tax on dairy products 
over the same period. The countries/regions most affected by this policy change are the 
European Union, Canada, United States, Norway, Switzerland, and Argentina. All other 
policies are kept at their baseline levels. The scenario results for Chile and Argentina are 
summarized in Table 4 in terms of percentage change from the baseline levels. 
It is clear from Table 4 that international markets for dairy products are not affected 
equally by the removal of export subsidies. In particular, butter and cheese prices rise 
substantially more than do milk powder prices. This is because of the elimination of EU 
subsidized butter exports. CAP policies that keep butter prices above international levels 
prevent the European Union from exporting butter once subsidies are removed. This 
assumes that the European Union will not change its butter and NFD support prices 
beyond the reforms enacted in 2004 and that it will support both butter and NFD prices at 
95% of the legislated intervention price. Consequently, butter and NFD production 
remain attractive to domestic producers, and substantial government stocks are allowed to 
accumulate. 
As subsidy cuts deepen in 2008 and 2009, higher international prices stimulate addi-
tional exports from Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, Uruguay, the Ukraine, Chile, and 
the United States for selected products. The growth in Argentine exports is further 
encouraged by the removal of the export tax, boosting domestic prices an additional 10% 
to 15%. In percentage terms, Argentine butter and cheese exports experience the greatest  
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TABLE 4. Scenario 1 results for Argentina and Chile 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
International Prices Percentage Change from the Baseline 
Butter 0.0 1.6 10.2 13.2 25.1 22.0 20.1 19.7 19.2 18.5 
Cheese 0.0 3.6 6.4 7.0 10.6 8.2 7.2 7.1 7.7 7.5 
NFD 0.0 6.2 8.7 2.2 -0.3 -2.2 -1.4 -1.0 1.5 1.6 
WMP 0.0 3.3 4.3 1.5 1.1 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.7 
Cow Inventories  
Argentina 0.0 0.0 0.9 2.2 3.3 4.6 5.2 5.6 5.8 6.1 
Chile 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.8 1.0 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 
Milk Production  
Argentina 0.0 0.0 0.9 2.2 3.3 4.6 5.2 5.6 5.8 6.1 
Chile 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.1 1.2 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 
Argentine Net Exports  
Butter 0.0 10.9 43.2 55.8 87.9 83.9 80.2 76.2 74.5 69.6 
Cheese 0.0 6.8 13.7 26.9 43.7 43.5 45.5 45.1 44.0 42.2 
NFD 0.0 4.4 12.2 11.7 15.8 17.1 18.4 18.8 20.5 20.4 
WMP 0.0 1.3 3.2 7.3 10.1 13.9 15.9 17.1 17.5 18.5 
Chilean Net Exports           
Butter 0.0 -23.5 -57.3 -19.7 -15.7 -15.7 -24.2 -26.8 -38.6 -41.4 
Cheese 0.0 -0.4 2.9 21.1 34.1 32.7 33.5 30.7 27.1 24.9 
NFD 0.0 -9.1 -14.4 5.9 18.0 17.6 9.8 8.0 -0.3 -1.7 
WMP 0.0 16.5 26.0 19.5 17.5 16.9 12.4 11.8 11.5 10.6 
 
growth, rising an average of 65% and 35%, respectively. However, in actual volumes, 
cheese and WMP net exports increase the most in Argentina, increasing to 50 tmt and 40 
tmt, respectively, by the end of the simulation period. Argentina captures roughly 18% of 
the cheese trade lost by European countries following the removal of subsidies.  
Higher dairy product prices translate into higher milk prices and profitability for dairy 
producers in Argentina. Farmers respond by adding up to 159,000 new dairy cows to the 
herd, generating 0.8 mmt of milk. Production of all four major products increases in Argen-
tina, but cheese and WMP production absorbs roughly 70% of the additional milk produced. 
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The Chilean dairy sector also benefits from removal of export subsidies. Unlike Ar-
gentina, the domestic price effects are purely driven by changes in world market prices. 
Consequently, the changes in cattle inventories and milk production are substantially 
lower than in Argentina. The more moderate production effects also reflect the fact that 
the Chilean industry is not poised to respond as readily to changes in international 
conditions as is the Argentine dairy sector. Nevertheless, Chilean milk production 
increases up to 2% over the baseline. The additional milk is roughly evenly split between 
cheese and WMP production. All of the additional cheese production and most of the 
WMP is placed on international markets. Chile is a net importer of butter in the baseline, 
and net imports decline slightly as a result of lower domestic consumption at higher 
prices. Chile is also a net importer of NFD, but NFD imports increase slightly in some 
years because small quantities of milk are shifted from NFD and butter production to 
more profitable cheese and WMP production. 
Scenario 2: Exports Subsidy and Tariff Liberalization 
This scenario builds on the first scenario by reducing tariffs according to the sched-
ule of cuts outlined in the November 2005 U.S. proposal for the Doha Round of trade 
negotiations. Table 5 shows the banded schedule of tariff cuts for both developed and 
developing countries. The magnitude of each country’s tariff cuts are determined by the 
ad valorem equivalent of the average tariff rate from 1999 to 2001. Tariff cuts are only 
applied to bound tariffs and over-quota rates for TRQs. In-quota tariff rates were not 
changed; however, if reduced over-quota rates fall below current in-quota rates, the over-
quota rate is the effective tariff rate. Sensitive product exemptions to the tariff cuts were  
 
TABLE 5. Schedule of tariff cuts 
 Developed Country Cuts (%) Developing Country Cuts (%) 
Thresholds of ad valorem 
equivalent of tariffs  
Beginning tier Ending tier Beginning tier Ending tier 
0 < d ≤ 20 55.00 65.00 36.67 43.33 
20 < d ≤ 40 65.00 75.00 43.33 50.00 
40 < d ≤ 60 75.00 85.00 50.00 56.67 
60 < d 85.00 90.00 56.67 60.00 
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not considered. Likewise, existing TRQ quantities were not changed in the scenario. 
Tariff cuts for developed countries were implemented in five equal cuts beginning in 
2007. Reductions in developing country tariffs were implemented similarly over a10-year 
period. Finally, tariff cuts were only applied to current WTO member countries. The 
impacts of tariff liberalization and export subsidy elimination on Argentina and Chile are 
summarized in Table 6. 
The tariff cuts outlined in Table 5 are substantial, particularly for developed coun-
tries. Consequently, world net imports of butter and milk powders are higher than in the 
previous scenario, but net imports still remain substantially below the baseline, except for 
WMP. World price increases relative to the baseline are much larger than in the first 
scenario, particularly for butter. These higher prices offset some of the impacts of tariff 
reductions on import levels. This is particularly evident in the case of cheese, where net 
imports are lower in this scenario than in scenario 1.  
Higher international dairy product prices induce an even larger expansion of Argen-
tina’s milk production compared to the first scenario. Milk prices in the latter half of the 
scenario average about $0.19 per liter, which is 21% higher than the baseline level. By 
2015, Argentina’s milk production reaches 15 mmt, which is more than a million metric 
tons over the baseline level. Thus, the growth in Argentine milk production following 
tariff liberalization is more than 20% higher than with export subsidy elimination alone. 
Roughly 40% of the additional milk production is used to make cheese, and one-third of 
the growth is used to make WMP. Butter and NFD production also expands slightly. On a 
milk-solids basis, Argentina is the exporting country that gains the most from trade 
liberalization, raising total dairy exports by 67 tmt of milk solids over the baseline in 
2015. Most of Argentina’s growth in exports occurs in cheese and WMP trade. New 
Zealand, Australia, and Brazil also gain substantially, with each increasing its total dairy 
product exports by more than 40 tmt on a milk-solid basis. 
Although Chile is a net importer of butter and NFD, it currently applies duties on 
dairy products that are much lower than its bound rates. Consequently, the cuts to bound 
rates have no impact on domestic dairy product prices. Thus, the changes in Chile’s dairy 
sector following tariff liberalization are simply reflections of changes in world market 
prices. As expected, milk production in Chile increases relative to the baseline and  
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TABLE 6. Scenario 2 results for Argentina and Chile 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
International Prices Percentage Change from the Baseline 
Butter 0.0 4.1 12.9 17.0 35.7 32.4 32.0 32.7 33.6 34.1 
Cheese 0.0 4.9 6.7 7.1 15.0 12.0 11.1 11.4 12.3 12.7 
NFD 0.0 6.5 9.1 1.6 0.9 -1.1 -0.3 -0.3 1.5 1.4 
WMP 0.0 3.9 5.3 2.9 4.0 2.6 3.2 3.6 4.4 4.8 
Cow Inventories  
Argentina 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.4 3.5 5.3 6.1 6.7 7.1 7.4 
Chile 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.4 2.2 2.5 2.9 3.2 3.4 
Milk Production  
Argentina 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.4 3.5 5.3 6.1 6.7 7.1 7.4 
Chile 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.4 1.7 2.7 3.0 3.4 3.7 4.0 
Argentine Net Exports  
Butter 0.0 16.1 49.4 62.7 108.1 105.1 103.9 100.0 97.9 92.3 
Cheese 0.0 9.4 13.4 27.0 51.2 49.6 53.3 54.1 53.8 52.8 
NFD 0.0 4.8 13.2 11.8 17.6 20.2 22.2 22.6 24.1 23.9 
WMP 0.0 1.2 3.7 8.3 10.8 15.6 18.4 20.3 21.4 22.9 
Chilean Net Exports           
Butter 0.0 -22.6 -70.9 -36.3 -36.2 -43.9 -58.8 -62.6 -75.9 -82.5 
Cheese 0.0 2.3 3.0 24.1 44.3 44.9 50.5 50.0 48.4 47.5 
NFD 0.0 -7.1 -16.7 4.4 20.2 16.9 5.7 4.7 -2.4 -3.6 
WMP 0.0 20.7 32.9 27.5 32.3 33.8 27.7 27.4 26.8 25.9 
 
relative to the result in the first scenario. Milk production reaches 3.1 mmt by 2015, and the 
dairy cow inventory grows to 714,000 cows. The growth in milk production is double the 
growth under export subsidy elimination alone. Farm milk prices in Chile average $0.25 per 
liter in the latter half of the scenario, which is roughly 7% higher than the baseline levels. 
The additional milk is split fairly evenly between cheese and WMP production, increasing 
net exports an average of 48% and 28%, respectively, over the baseline in the latter half of 
the scenario. High international butter prices cause domestic butter consumption and 
imports to decline, and Chile very nearly becomes a net exporter of butter in some years.  
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Conclusions 
This report assessed the international competitiveness of Argentina and Chile’s dairy 
industries, combining market intelligence gathered from recent field visits and from the 
literature with quantitative simulations of global policy reform scenarios based on the 
CDIM model. Both countries exhibit strong potential for export growth, but each faces its 
own internal and external hindrances to dairy industry expansion. Both countries also 
face common barriers to expansion caused by distortions in world dairy markets.  
Argentina has the strongest dairy potential based on its multiple sources of competi-
tiveness in dairy markets, including modern dairy and processing industries, cheap 
feedstuffs, abundant pasture, and good infrastructure. Its major handicaps stem from its 
macroeconomic and trade policies that discourage investment in the dairy sector and 
make the country risky for foreign investment. Chile’s natural potential for dairy expan-
sion is not as sizeable as Argentina’s, but its trade and macro policies are export oriented 
and provide a significant source of competitiveness. Chile’s country risk is the lowest in 
Latin America, and political institutions are aligned with market forces to promote 
economic growth there. The success and speed of the dairy industry’s transition from a 
domestic market focus to export-driven growth will determine whether or not Chile will 
become a major player in international dairy markets in the foreseeable future. 
The simulation results suggest that global policy reforms would resolve some of the 
common international obstacles faced by these two countries in foreign dairy markets. If, 
as part of the reform process, Argentina removes its export taxes on dairy products, the 
gains to the Argentine dairy sector will be substantially greater than would otherwise be 
the case. World dairy prices are expected to increase significantly with trade liberaliza-
tion. In the scenario analysis, butter prices increase 34% by 2015, chiefly because of the 
removal of sizeable export subsidies in the European Union. Herds and milk production 
in Argentina would increase by more than 7%; whereas the expansion in Chile would be 
more modest, representing a bit more than 3% by 2015. Dairy exports for the two coun-
tries would expand as well. Argentina’s exports of butter and cheese would increase by 
92% and 53% respectively, while Chile’s exports of cheese and powder would increase 
by nearly 48% and 26%, respectively. 
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These two case studies highlight the synergistic relationship between economic re-
sources and sound policies in determining a country’s competitiveness in international 
markets. An abundance of the right resources—land, feedstuffs, technology, financial 
capital, human capital—is critical to the development of low-cost dairy production. 
Nevertheless, sound economic and trade policies can either facilitate or hinder the 
exploitation of resource advantages. Chile is also an interesting example because it 
illustrates the transition a country goes through as an industry develops and the country 
becomes a net exporter. 
The experiences of Argentina and Chile also shed light on U.S. dairy prospects in 
global markets. The U.S. dairy industry combines most of the sources of competitiveness 
characterizing its two South American competitors: availability of inexpensive feed and 
land in many regions suitable for dairy production, high human capital, access to modern 
technology, an efficient processing sector, excellent transportation and communication 
infrastructures, low capital cost and credit risk, and a tradition in dairy production. So it is 
puzzling that the United States does not export more dairy products. The current U.S. 
dairy program, with its price distortions and border impediments, obscures the interna-
tional competitiveness of the U.S. dairy sector and provides producers with incentives to 
remain focused on domestic rather than on foreign markets. Eliminating the policy-driven 
incentives that create a domestic bias would force the U.S. dairy industry to turn its 
attention outward, where it is well equipped to be internationally competitive in world 
markets, especially in an environment with increased international market access. 
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Appendix 1 
CIDM Baseline Tables  
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 Table A1.1. Baseline butter trade
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Net Exporters (Thousand Metric Tons)
   Argentina 5 5 5 5 6 6 7 8 8 9
   Australia 77 81 82 87 91 96 99 103 107 111
   Brazil -1 1 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -3 -4
   EU New Member States 43 46 49 53 55 57 58 57 56 55
   European Union-15 177 172 167 165 163 160 158 157 156 155
   New Zealand 310 310 314 317 321 325 330 335 339 344
   Ukraine 30 28 26 26 26 26 25 25 26 25
   Uruguay 10 12 14 15 16 16 16 16 16 15
   Total Net Exports * 664 676 687 695 701 708 713 716 719 719
Net Importers 
   Algeria 16 17 18 20 21 22 23 24 26 27
   Bulgaria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
   Canada 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 11 11 11
   Chile 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
   China 26 27 28 30 32 33 34 35 36 36
   Colombia 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 6
   Egypt 23 25 27 30 32 34 37 40 42 45
   India -12 -21 -28 -26 -22 -23 -20 -15 -12 -5
   Indonesia 11 11 12 12 12 13 13 14 14 14
   Japan 6 7 8 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
   Malaysia 10 10 11 11 12 12 12 13 13 14
   Mexico 56 57 59 60 62 64 66 68 71 74
   Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Philippines 10 10 10 11 11 11 11 12 12 12
   Peru 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4
   Romania 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
   Russia 162 165 164 163 163 163 163 161 159 157
   Saudi Arabia 39 39 40 42 44 45 47 49 52 55
   South Korea 1 2 2 3 3 3 2 3 3 2
   Switzerland 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2
   Thailand 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 19 20 20
   United States 15 15 16 18 19 20 22 23 24 26
   Venezuela 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
   Vietnam 7 7 7 8 8 8 9 9 10 10
   Rest of World 244 242 242 237 229 221 211 199 188 175
   Total Net Imports 664 676 687 695 701 708 713 716 719 719
Price (U.S. Dollars per Metric Ton)
   FOB Price N. Europe 1,755 1,803 1,853 1,849 1,860 1,891 1,920 1,946 1,972 1,992
* Total net exports are the sum of all positive net exports and negative net imports.  
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Table A1.2. Baseline cheese trade
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Net Exporters (Thousand Metric Tons)
   Argentina 63 66 67 68 73 82 92 101 110 119
   Australia 190 193 209 220 235 251 268 283 298 313
   Brazil 3 4 5 2 -2 -6 -9 -12 -16 -19
   Bulgaria 15 16 16 18 18 18 19 19 19 19
   Chile 10 8 8 9 11 12 12 14 16 17
   Colombia -1 -2 -3 -4 -6 -7 -8 -10 -11 -13
   EU New Member States 127 118 114 116 119 120 121 122 124 125
   European Union-15 391 380 378 386 395 401 405 409 416 420
   New Zealand 253 296 306 317 327 337 348 358 368 378
   Norway 9 9 9 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
   Switzerland 48 53 58 62 63 63 64 65 66 68
   Ukraine 125 125 124 124 125 126 127 128 129 131
   Uruguay 18 20 22 24 25 26 27 28 28 29
   Total Net Exports * 1,254 1,287 1,316 1,356 1,403 1,449 1,495 1,541 1,590 1,636
Net Importers 
   Algeria 28 30 31 32 34 35 36 37 39 40
   Canada 19 19 18 18 18 17 17 16 15 14
   China 30 32 39 45 51 55 60 63 66 68
   Egypt 7 7 7 7 8 9 9 10 10 11
   Indonesia 8 9 9 9 10 10 10 12 12 11
   Japan 214 217 221 227 232 236 240 244 248 251
   Malaysia 7 7 8 8 8 9 9 9 10 10
   Mexico 85 90 84 84 86 86 86 88 92 96
   Peru 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3
   Philippines 20 21 21 22 23 23 24 25 26 27
   Romania -1 -1 -2 -3 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8
   Russia 210 220 223 228 235 242 248 253 258 262
   Saudi Arabia 71 73 74 77 80 82 85 87 90 94
   South Korea 42 42 43 46 48 50 51 53 54 55
   Thailand 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4
   United States 122 124 126 128 130 131 133 135 137 139
   Venezuela 13 15 16 18 20 21 23 24 25 27
   Vietnam 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
   Rest of World 369 374 387 396 409 422 438 454 471 489
   Total Net Imports 1,254 1,287 1,316 1,356 1,403 1,449 1,495 1,541 1,590 1,636
Price (U.S. Dollars per Metric Ton)
   FOB Price N. Europe 2,689 2,749 2,842 2,851 2,860 2,905 2,948 2,976 3,001 3,017
* Total net exports are the sum of all positive net exports and negative net imports.  
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Table A1.3. Baseline nonfat dry milk trade
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Net Exporters (Thousand Metric Tons)
   Argentina 22 25 26 28 30 32 34 36 39 41
   Australia 179 182 182 183 182 184 186 187 188 190
   Brazil -1 -1 -1 -1 -3 -4 -5 -6 -5 -5
   Canada -3 7 6 0 3 2 3 4 5 5
   Colombia 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
   EU New Member States 166 159 156 160 165 165 166 167 169 170
   European Union-15 141 132 130 130 128 128 127 125 122 121
   India 19 30 32 34 36 38 40 43 46 49
   New Zealand 233 235 235 236 236 237 238 240 241 243
   Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Switzerland 14 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 16 16
   Ukraine 64 61 59 58 56 55 52 51 51 49
   United States 264 273 303 332 359 400 443 485 526 567
   Uruguay 15 18 20 21 22 21 21 20 19 18
   Total Net Exports 1,117 1,137 1,165 1,197 1,233 1,277 1,325 1,372 1,420 1,468
Net Importers 
   Algeria 105 109 114 119 124 129 134 138 143 148
   Bulgaria 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
   Chile 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 3
   China 54 56 57 57 58 59 61 62 63 65
   Egypt 20 20 20 21 22 22 23 23 24 24
   Indonesia 90 94 98 101 105 109 113 117 121 126
   Japan 20 19 21 23 24 26 28 30 31 32
   Malaysia 55 57 59 60 62 64 66 68 70 72
   Mexico 172 173 175 177 180 184 188 191 195 199
   Peru 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8
   Philippines 135 138 141 144 147 151 154 158 161 165
   Romania 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1
   Russia 45 49 49 49 49 50 50 49 48 46
   Saudi Arabia 28 29 29 30 31 33 34 35 36 38
   South Korea 1 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
   Thailand 87 89 92 94 96 98 100 103 106 108
   Venezuela 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
   Vietnam 31 33 35 38 40 42 45 48 50 53
   Rest of World 249 245 248 257 266 280 299 317 337 360
   Total Net Imports 1,117 1,137 1,165 1,197 1,233 1,277 1,325 1,372 1,420 1,468
Price (U.S. Dollars per Metric Ton)
   FOB Price N. Europe 1,983 2,040 2,101 2,131 2,134 2,146 2,154 2,158 2,160 2,163
* Total net exports are the sum of all positive net exports and negative net imports.  
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Table A1.4. Baseline whole milk powder trade
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Net Exporters (Thousand Metric Tons)
   Argentina 185 189 195 200 200 202 205 208 212 216
   Australia 179 191 208 223 240 259 278 298 319 340
   Brazil 12 3 5 3 -1 -5 -9 -12 -15 -19
   Chile 6 10 13 16 18 20 23 27 31 36
   Colombia 24 23 23 21 18 15 12 9 5 1
   EU New Member States 38 37 37 37 37 38 37 37 37 37
   European Union-15 613 594 589 596 600 601 597 594 594 591
   New Zealand 627 674 695 710 725 743 760 777 794 812
   Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Ukraine 19 18 18 17 17 17 16 16 16 16
   Uruguay 12 24 27 31 34 38 42 46 49 53
   Total Net Exports 1,714 1,765 1,811 1,853 1,888 1,933 1,971 2,012 2,058 2,101
Net Importers 
   Algeria 165 170 176 182 187 193 199 205 210 216
   Bulgaria 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
   Canada 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4
   China 19 28 32 33 37 47 43 31 25 13
   Egypt 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 8 8
   Indonesia 24 26 28 30 32 33 35 37 39 41
   Malaysia 91 94 98 102 106 110 114 119 123 128
   Mexico 29 33 35 38 42 45 48 51 55 58
   Peru 7 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11
   Philippines 16 17 19 20 21 22 23 24 26 26
   Romania 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
   Russia 27 29 30 30 33 35 38 40 42 44
   Saudi Arabia 116 121 124 129 134 139 145 151 157 163
   South Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
   Thailand 38 39 40 42 42 42 43 44 44 45
   United States 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
   Venezuela 96 99 101 104 107 110 114 117 120 123
   Vietnam 47 51 56 61 66 71 76 81 87 94
   Rest of World 1,018 1,028 1,045 1,055 1,051 1,050 1,054 1,068 1,082 1,096
   Total Net Imports 1,714 1,765 1,811 1,853 1,888 1,933 1,971 2,012 2,058 2,101
Price (U.S. Dollars per Metric Ton)
   FOB Price N. Europe 2,069 2,132 2,233 2,245 2,243 2,282 2,303 2,318 2,339 2,344
* Total net exports are the sum of all positive net exports and negative net imports.  
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Table A1.5. Baseline Argentine dairy supply and utilization
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
(Thousand Head)
Milk Cow Numbers 2,149 2,197 2,246 2,294 2,343 2,394 2,448 2,503 2,560 2,618
(Kilograms)
Milk Production per Cow 4,790 4,855 4,910 4,975 5,040 5,105 5,170 5,235 5,300 5,365
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Cow Milk Production 10,296 10,666 11,029 11,415 11,808 12,221 12,656 13,107 13,572 14,048
Fluid Milk Consumption 2,001 2,068 2,141 2,216 2,292 2,366 2,442 2,520 2,599 2,682
Manufacturing Use 8,291 8,593 8,882 9,194 9,512 9,851 10,210 10,582 10,967 11,361
Butter 
Production 50 51 53 55 58 60 62 64 66 69
   Domestic Supply 52 53 55 57 60 62 64 66 68 71
Consumption 45 46 48 50 52 53 55 57 58 60
Net Exports 5 5 5 5 6 6 7 8 8 9
Ending Stocks 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
   Domestic Use 52 53 55 57 60 62 64 66 68 71
Cheese 
Production 426 438 456 477 501 527 554 582 610 639
   Domestic Supply 456 472 490 511 535 561 588 616 644 673
Consumption 358 372 389 409 428 445 462 481 500 519
Net Exports 63.5 65.9 66.6 68.0 73.5 82.1 91.6 101.0 110.4 119.5
Ending Stocks 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
   Domestic Use 456 472 490 511 535 561 588 616 644 673
Nonfat Dry Milk 
Production 42 45 48 50 53 55 58 61 64 67
   Domestic Supply 44 47 50 52 55 57 60 63 66 69
Consumption 20 20 21 22 23 23 24 25 25 26
Net Exports 22 25 26 28 30 32 34 36 39 41
Ending Stocks 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
   Domestic Use 44 47 50 52 55 57 60 63 66 69
Whole Milk Powder 
Production 270 284 293 301 305 311 317 323 331 338
   Domestic Supply 294 303 312 320 324 330 336 342 350 357
Consumption 90 94 97 101 105 108 112 115 118 122
Net Exports 185 189 195 200 200 202 205 208 212 216
Ending Stocks 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
   Domestic Use 294 303 312 320 324 330 336 342 350 357
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Table A1.6. Baseline Chilean dairy supply and utilization 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
(Thousand Head)
Milk Cow Numbers 627 633 638 643 649 653 659 668 677 688
(Kilograms)
Milk Production per Cow 3,797 3,838 3,896 3,962 4,026 4,091 4,164 4,239 4,313 4,388
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Cow Milk Production 2,382 2,428 2,485 2,549 2,611 2,672 2,746 2,830 2,921 3,020
Fluid Milk Consumption 480 487 495 508 522 536 552 569 586 604
Manufacturing Use 1,731 1,769 1,817 1,868 1,915 1,961 2,018 2,085 2,157 2,236
Butter 
Production 14 15 15 15 16 16 16 17 17 17
   Domestic Supply 14 15 15 15 16 16 16 17 17 17
Consumption 16 16 16 17 17 17 18 18 19 19
Net Exports -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -2 -2 -2 -2
Ending Stocks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Domestic  Use 14 15 15 15 16 16 16 17 17 17
Cheese 
Production 73 73 75 78 81 83 86 89 93 97
   Domestic Supply 73 73 75 78 81 83 86 89 93 97
Consumption 63 65 67 68 70 72 74 75 77 80
Net Exports 10 8 8 9 11 12 12 14 16 17
Ending Stocks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Domestic  Use 73 73 75 78 81 83 86 89 93 97
Nonfat Dry Milk 
Production 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 12 13 13
   Domestic Supply 14 13 13 14 14 14 14 14 15 15
Consumption 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Net Exports -4 -5 -5 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -3
Ending Stocks 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
   Domestic  Use 14 13 13 14 14 14 14 14 15 15
Whole Milk Powder 
Production 60 65 68 70 71 73 75 78 81 85
   Domestic Supply 63 69 72 74 75 77 79 82 85 89
Consumption 53 56 55 54 54 53 52 51 50 49
Net Exports 6 10 13 16 18 20 23 27 31 36
Ending Stocks 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
   Domestic  Use 63 69 72 74 75 77 79 82 85 89
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Table A2.1. Scenario 1 butter trade change
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Net Exporters (Thousand Metric Tons)
   Argentina 0 1 2 3 5 5 5 6 6 6
   Australia 0 1 5 6 11 9 9 10 10 10
   Brazil 0 0 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
   EU New Member States 0 -6 -3 -9 -12 -13 -15 -17 -18 -20
   European Union-15 0 -2 -81 -108 -191 -178 -167 -167 -166 -165
   New Zealand 0 2 6 6 8 8 9 9 10 11
   Ukraine 0 0 3 6 7 8 8 8 8 8
   Uruguay 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3
   Total Net Exports * 0 1 -39 -62 -83 -89 -93 -95 -93 -94
Net Importers 
   Algeria 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
   Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Canada 0 1 -1 -1 -2 -2 -1 -1 -1 -1
   Chile 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1
   China 0 0 -2 -3 -5 -5 -4 -4 -4 -4
   Colombia 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
   Egypt 0 0 -3 -3 -6 -5 -5 -5 -5 -5
   India 0 -4 -25 -32 -56 -49 -45 -43 -42 -40
   Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Japan 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
   Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Mexico 0 -1 -3 -3 -5 -5 -5 -5 -5 -5
   Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Philippines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Peru 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 0
   Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Russia 0 -2 -9 -16 -23 -23 -22 -22 -23 -23
   Saudi Arabia 0 -1 -4 -5 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8
   South Korea 0 0 -2 -2 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4
   Switzerland 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
   Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   United States 0 0 -2 -3 -5 -6 -7 -9 -9 -12
   Venezuela 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Vietnam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Rest of World 0 5 -11 -23 -49 -46 -42 -41 -38 -36
   Total Net Imports 0 1 -39 -62 -83 -89 -93 -95 -93 -94
Price (U.S. Dollars per Metric Ton)
   FOB Price N. Europe 0.0 26.9 177.8 228.6 437.6 390.5 363.3 360.2 355.9 346.9
* Total net exports are the sum of all positive net exports and negative net imports.  
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Table A2.2. Scenario 1 cheese trade change
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Net Exporters (Thousand Metric Tons)
   Argentina 0 4 9 18 32 36 42 46 49 50
   Australia 0 -1 -2 14 23 23 23 23 21 21
   Brazil 0 4 9 12 19 18 17 17 18 19
   Bulgaria 0 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2
   Chile 0 0 0 2 4 4 4 4 4 4
   Colombia 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
   EU New Member States 0 10 19 20 20 18 15 13 12 10
   European Union-15 0 -32 -64 -123 -181 -190 -199 -203 -207 -212
   New Zealand 0 -1 -1 10 18 20 21 20 19 20
   Norway 0 -3 -6 -9 -12 -12 -12 -12 -12 -12
   Switzerland 0 -12 -25 -41 -57 -57 -58 -58 -58 -58
   Ukraine 0 0 2 11 18 19 21 21 20 20
   Uruguay 0 0 0 1 2 3 3 3 3 3
   Total Net Exports * 0 -30 -58 -81 -108 -118 -125 -130 -139 -146
Net Importers 
   Algeria 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
   Canada 0 1 2 4 6 6 7 7 6 6
   China 0 1 1 -4 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -4
   Egypt 0 -1 -1 -1 -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
   Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Japan 0 0 -1 -2 -2 -3 -3 -2 -2 -2
   Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Mexico 0 -2 -5 -10 -16 -16 -15 -15 -15 -15
   Peru 0 0 -1 -1 -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
   Philippines 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 0 -1 -1
   Romania 0 0 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 0
   Russia 0 -7 -19 -33 -46 -60 -71 -72 -75 -78
   Saudi Arabia 0 -2 -4 -4 -6 -5 -4 -4 -5 -5
   South Korea 0 -1 -2 -3 -5 -5 -5 -5 -5 -5
   Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   United States 0 -10 -21 -24 -32 -29 -25 -26 -25 -26
   Venezuela 0 -1 -3 -3 -4 -4 -3 -4 -3 -3
   Vietnam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Rest of World 0 -6 -3 2 10 11 10 10 7 6
   Total Net Imports 0 -30 -58 -81 -108 -118 -125 -130 -139 -146
Price (U.S. Dollars per Metric Ton)
   FOB Price N. Europe 0.0 103.4 191.3 208.9 318.6 249.1 222.4 222.1 243.1 236.5
* Total net exports are the sum of all positive net exports and negative net imports.  
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Table A2.3. Scenario 1 nonfat dry milk trade change
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Net Exporters (Thousand Metric Tons)
   Argentina 0 1 3 3 5 5 6 7 8 8
   Australia 0 4 8 7 13 14 15 16 18 17
   Brazil 0 3 6 7 9 10 11 12 13 14
   Canada 0 -8 -10 -4 -7 -6 -7 -8 -9 -9
   Colombia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   EU New Member States 0 -4 -21 -36 -57 -56 -57 -58 -59 -61
   European Union-15 0 -38 -84 -55 -54 -50 -52 -69 -101 -113
   India 0 4 10 8 11 10 10 10 11 12
   New Zealand 0 4 12 10 12 12 13 14 17 17
   Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Switzerland 0 -4 -7 -11 -15 -15 -15 -15 -15 -15
   Ukraine 0 1 6 10 10 12 12 12 12 13
   United States 0 12 22 17 21 20 17 31 40 51
   Uruguay 0 0 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3
   Total Net Exports 0 -25 -51 -42 -49 -42 -45 -47 -63 -63
Net Importers 
   Algeria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Chile 0 0 -1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
   China 0 -3 -4 0 1 2 1 1 -1 -1
   Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Indonesia 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Japan 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Mexico 0 -2 -4 0 1 1 0 0 -1 -1
   Peru 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Philippines 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Russia 0 -3 -9 -17 -20 -20 -21 -22 -24 -26
   Saudi Arabia 0 -2 -2 -1 0 1 0 0 0 0
   South Korea 0 -1 -2 -2 -2 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3
   Thailand 0 -1 -1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
   Venezuela 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Vietnam 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Rest of World 0 -10 -26 -22 -31 -25 -23 -23 -30 -29
   Total Net Imports 0 -25 -51 -42 -49 -42 -45 -47 -63 -63
Price (U.S. Dollars per Metric Ton)
   FOB Price N. Europe 0.0 141.1 203.0 50.9 -6.7 -52.8 -33.3 -23.6 37.0 37.6
* Total net exports are the sum of all positive net exports and negative net imports.  
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Table A2.4. Scenario 1 whole milk powder trade change
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Net Exporters (Thousand Metric Tons)
   Argentina 0 2 6 15 20 28 33 36 37 40
   Australia 0 -1 -5 -2 -3 -1 1 1 0 1
   Brazil 0 7 12 9 12 10 11 12 14 15
   Chile 0 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4
   Colombia 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   EU New Member States 0 2 2 -3 -7 -7 -8 -7 -7 -7
   European Union-15 0 -46 -75 -70 -72 -76 -78 -83 -88 -96
   New Zealand 0 0 -2 5 2 7 8 8 6 9
   Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Ukraine 0 0 1 3 4 5 5 5 5 5
   Uruguay 0 1 6 7 7 10 5 5 6 7
   Total Net Exports 0 -32 -49 -33 -34 -25 -29 -33 -37 -39
Net Importers 
   Algeria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   China 0 -12 -21 -14 -11 -6 -5 -4 -6 -6
   Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Indonesia 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Mexico 0 -1 -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 -2 -2 -2
   Peru 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Philippines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Russia 0 -1 -3 -6 -6 -8 -8 -9 -9 -10
   Saudi Arabia 0 -2 -3 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0
   South Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   United States 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Venezuela 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Vietnam 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Rest of World 0 -14 -17 -10 -14 -7 -6 -6 -5 -5
   Total Net Imports 0 -32 -49 -33 -34 -25 -29 -33 -37 -39
Price (U.S. Dollars per Metric Ton)
   FOB Price N. Europe 0.0 83.6 113.0 38.5 28.7 -4.6 1.2 5.2 20.6 19.0
* Total net exports are the sum of all positive net exports and negative net imports.  
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Table A2.5. Scenario 1 Argentine dairy supply and utilization pct. change
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
(Percent)
Milk Cow Numbers 0.00 0.00 0.85 2.24 3.30 4.63 5.24 5.60 5.82 6.07
Milk Production per Cow 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cow Milk Production 0.00 0.00 0.85 2.24 3.30 4.63 5.24 5.60 5.82 6.07
Fluid Milk Consumption 0.00 -0.56 -1.03 -1.04 -1.35 -1.13 -1.05 -0.99 -1.00 -0.93
Manufacturing Use 0.00 0.13 1.30 3.04 4.42 6.02 6.75 7.17 7.44 7.72
Butter 
Production 0.00 0.29 1.59 1.95 3.18 3.91 4.56 4.93 5.48 5.67
   Domestic Supply 0.00 0.28 1.53 1.88 3.07 3.78 4.42 4.78 5.32 5.51
Consumption 0.00 -0.91 -3.11 -3.91 -6.25 -5.42 -4.86 -4.55 -4.25 -3.93
Net Exports 0.00 10.85 43.21 55.77 87.88 83.85 80.19 76.23 74.53 69.65
Ending Stocks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Domestic Use 0.00 0.28 1.53 1.88 3.07 3.78 4.42 4.78 5.32 5.51
Cheese 
Production 0.00 -0.39 -0.49 0.90 2.57 3.62 4.75 5.27 5.49 5.65
   Domestic Supply 0.00 -0.36 -0.46 0.84 2.40 3.40 4.48 4.98 5.20 5.36
Consumption 0.00 -1.66 -2.92 -3.41 -4.50 -3.73 -3.32 -3.10 -3.00 -2.76
Net Exports 0.00 6.77 13.70 26.86 43.70 43.46 45.50 45.10 43.96 42.21
Ending Stocks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Domestic Use 0.00 -0.36 -0.46 0.84 2.40 3.40 4.48 4.98 5.20 5.36
Nonfat Dry Milk 
Production 0.00 1.38 5.20 5.38 7.84 8.95 9.83 10.30 11.42 11.59
   Domestic Supply 0.00 1.32 4.99 5.17 7.55 8.63 9.50 9.97 11.07 11.26
Consumption 0.00 -2.24 -3.49 -2.78 -2.84 -2.32 -2.32 -2.25 -2.49 -2.35
Net Exports 0.00 4.40 12.17 11.69 15.83 17.15 18.37 18.81 20.53 20.38
Ending Stocks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Domestic Use 0.00 1.32 4.99 5.17 7.55 8.63 9.50 9.97 11.07 11.26
Whole Milk Powder 
Production 0.00 -0.01 0.73 3.43 4.88 7.52 8.80 9.58 9.87 10.51
   Domestic Supply 0.00 -0.01 0.69 3.22 4.60 7.08 8.30 9.05 9.33 9.95
Consumption 0.00 -2.63 -4.24 -4.27 -4.98 -4.37 -4.18 -3.97 -3.90 -3.65
Net Exports 0.00 1.30 3.21 7.33 10.08 13.88 15.86 17.06 17.53 18.47
Ending Stocks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Domestic Use 0.00 -0.01 0.69 3.22 4.60 7.08 8.30 9.05 9.33 9.95  
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Table A2.6. Scenario 1 Chilean dairy supply and utilization pct. change 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
(Percent)
Milk Cow Numbers 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.80 1.02 1.42 1.56 1.63 1.69 1.75
Milk Production per Cow 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.29 0.21 0.32 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.24
Cow Milk Production 0.00 0.00 0.45 1.09 1.23 1.75 1.80 1.86 1.92 2.00
Fluid Milk Consumption 0.00 -0.70 -1.44 -1.06 -1.66 -1.23 -1.13 -1.10 -1.14 -1.05
Manufacturing Use 0.00 0.19 1.00 1.77 2.09 2.67 2.69 2.76 2.83 2.91
Butter 
Production 0.00 1.87 3.42 -0.54 -2.72 -2.05 -0.72 -0.28 1.05 1.30
   Domestic Supply 0.00 1.87 3.42 -0.54 -2.72 -2.05 -0.72 -0.28 1.05 1.30
Consumption 0.00 -0.23 -1.55 -1.97 -3.71 -3.21 -2.88 -2.75 -2.62 -2.46
Net Exports 0.00 -23.46 -57.26 -19.71 -15.71 -15.67 -24.15 -26.77 -38.63 -41.38
Ending Stocks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Domestic  Use 0.00 1.87 3.42 -0.54 -2.72 -2.05 -0.72 -0.28 1.05 1.30
Cheese 
Production 0.00 -0.41 -0.34 1.84 3.43 3.76 4.19 4.09 3.85 3.87
   Domestic Supply 0.00 -0.41 -0.34 1.84 3.43 3.76 4.19 4.09 3.85 3.87
Consumption 0.00 -0.41 -0.76 -0.82 -1.23 -0.93 -0.80 -0.77 -0.81 -0.76
Net Exports 0.00 -0.38 2.90 21.06 34.11 32.70 33.54 30.69 27.07 24.94
Ending Stocks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Domestic  Use 0.00 -0.41 -0.34 1.84 3.43 3.76 4.19 4.09 3.85 3.87
Nonfat Dry Milk 
Production 0.00 2.65 4.14 -2.54 -5.95 -5.34 -2.86 -2.23 -0.17 0.17
   Domestic Supply 0.00 2.24 3.51 -2.17 -5.09 -4.57 -2.46 -1.92 -0.15 0.15
Consumption 0.00 -0.83 -1.21 -0.31 0.04 0.31 0.19 0.13 -0.21 -0.21
Net Exports 0.00 -9.09 -14.40 5.89 17.98 17.62 9.76 7.99 -0.32 -1.75
Ending Stocks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Domestic  Use 0.00 2.24 3.51 -2.17 -5.09 -4.57 -2.46 -1.92 -0.15 0.15
Whole Milk Powder 
Production 0.00 0.96 3.64 4.57 4.47 5.69 4.54 4.68 4.79 4.88
   Domestic Supply 0.00 0.90 3.44 4.32 4.23 5.39 4.31 4.45 4.57 4.66
Consumption 0.00 -1.71 -1.87 0.25 0.20 1.46 1.01 0.89 0.57 0.69
Net Exports 0.00 16.46 25.97 19.50 17.53 16.93 12.43 11.82 11.55 10.64
Ending Stocks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Domestic  Use 0.00 0.90 3.44 4.32 4.23 5.39 4.31 4.45 4.57 4.66  
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Table A3.1. Scenario 2 butter trade change
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Net Exporters (Thousand Metric Tons)
   Argentina 0 1 3 3 6 7 7 8 8 8
   Australia 0 2 5 6 13 10 12 13 14 15
   Brazil 0 1 1 2 4 4 4 5 5 5
   EU New Member States 0 -4 -1 -7 -7 -8 -10 -11 -11 -12
   European Union-15 0 -13 -82 -99 -194 -178 -174 -173 -171 -169
   New Zealand 0 2 7 7 10 11 12 13 15 15
   Ukraine 0 0 4 6 8 9 9 10 10 10
   Uruguay 0 0 1 1 2 3 4 4 4 5
   Total Net Exports * 0 -5 -40 -56 -78 -87 -89 -92 -91 -94
Net Importers 
   Algeria 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
   Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Canada 0 2 4 6 10 11 11 11 11 11
   Chile 0 0 -1 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
   China 0 -1 -3 -3 -6 -6 -6 -6 -7 -7
   Colombia 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
   Egypt 0 -1 -3 -4 -8 -7 -7 -8 -8 -8
   India 0 -5 -21 -25 -49 -38 -31 -27 -23 -19
   Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Japan 0 0 1 1 3 3 4 4 8 9
   Malaysia 0 0 0 0 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 -1
   Mexico 0 -1 -4 -3 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6
   Norway 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
   Philippines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1
   Peru 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
   Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Russia 0 -3 -11 -18 -29 -30 -31 -32 -33 -34
   Saudi Arabia 0 -1 -4 -5 -10 -10 -11 -11 -12 -12
   South Korea 0 0 -1 -1 -1 0 1 2 3 4
   Switzerland 0 0 -1 -1 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2
   Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   United States 0 0 1 5 6 5 4 2 1 -2
   Venezuela 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Vietnam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Rest of World 0 1 -16 -29 -61 -58 -56 -55 -54 -53
   Total Net Imports 0 -5 -40 -56 -78 -87 -89 -92 -91 -94
Price (U.S. Dollars per Metric Ton)
   FOB Price N. Europe 0.0 69.5 223.3 294.5 621.8 575.6 577.2 598.9 623.1 639.2
* Total net exports are the sum of all positive net exports and negative net imports.  
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Table A3.2. Scenario 2 cheese trade change
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Net Exporters (Thousand Metric Tons)
   Argentina 0 6 9 18 38 41 49 55 59 63
   Australia 0 1 -4 14 28 26 30 33 34 37
   Brazil 0 6 9 13 26 25 25 27 29 31
   Bulgaria 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 -1 -1 -2
   Chile 0 0 0 2 5 5 6 7 8 8
   Colombia 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
   EU New Member States 0 5 6 -3 -18 -22 -25 -28 -28 -31
   European Union-15 0 -35 -82 -156 -223 -236 -245 -251 -254 -260
   New Zealand 0 0 -2 10 21 23 27 29 31 33
   Norway 0 -3 -7 -10 -14 -14 -14 -14 -14 -14
   Switzerland 0 -11 -25 -41 -55 -54 -55 -55 -54 -54
   Ukraine 0 1 2 11 20 20 25 26 26 27
   Uruguay 0 0 0 1 3 3 4 5 5 5
   Total Net Exports * 0 -30 -91 -136 -163 -170 -170 -166 -166 -165
Net Importers 
   Algeria 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0
   Canada 0 3 7 12 19 19 20 19 19 19
   China 0 0 2 -3 -8 -7 -5 -5 -4 -4
   Egypt 0 -1 -1 -1 -2 -2 -1 -2 -2 -2
   Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Japan 0 0 1 3 7 11 16 20 23 25
   Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Mexico 0 0 4 4 6 13 22 30 39 48
   Peru 0 0 -1 -1 -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 0
   Philippines 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
   Romania 0 0 1 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
   Russia 0 -8 -22 -36 -54 -72 -87 -91 -96 -101
   Saudi Arabia 0 -3 -3 -3 -7 -6 -5 -5 -5 -5
   South Korea 0 -1 -2 -2 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2
   Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   United States 0 -13 -73 -113 -127 -141 -138 -142 -141 -143
   Venezuela 0 -1 -4 -4 -5 -6 -5 -6 -6 -6
   Vietnam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Rest of World 0 -5 0 7 15 16 16 17 15 15
   Total Net Imports 0 -30 -91 -136 -163 -170 -170 -166 -166 -165
Price (U.S. Dollars per Metric Ton)
   FOB Price N. Europe 0.0 143.2 200.5 213.2 452.0 368.1 344.9 357.1 388.3 402.2
* Total net exports are the sum of all positive net exports and negative net imports.  
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Table A3.3. Scenario 2 nonfat dry milk trade change
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Net Exporters (Thousand Metric Tons)
   Argentina 0 1 3 3 5 6 8 8 9 10
   Australia 0 4 9 7 15 17 19 20 23 23
   Brazil 0 4 7 7 13 14 16 18 20 22
   Canada 0 -9 -10 -5 -8 -7 -8 -9 -9 -10
   Colombia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   EU New Member States 0 -2 -17 -37 -55 -55 -54 -57 -58 -62
   European Union-15 0 -45 -90 -47 -63 -69 -76 -90 -113 -124
   India 0 5 10 7 12 10 9 9 10 9
   New Zealand 0 4 14 11 15 17 19 20 23 23
   Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Switzerland 0 -4 -7 -11 -15 -15 -15 -15 -15 -15
   Ukraine 0 0 6 10 11 13 14 15 15 16
   United States 0 12 21 18 17 20 15 31 36 51
   Uruguay 0 0 1 1 2 2 4 4 5 5
   Total Net Exports 0 -28 -51 -32 -51 -46 -48 -46 -55 -49
Net Importers 
   Algeria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Chile 0 0 -1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
   China 0 -2 -4 0 1 2 2 2 1 1
   Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Indonesia 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Japan 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Malaysia 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Mexico 0 -2 -4 0 1 2 2 2 2 3
   Peru 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Philippines 0 -1 -2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Russia 0 -4 -10 -17 -22 -24 -26 -27 -30 -32
   Saudi Arabia 0 -2 -2 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
   South Korea 0 0 -1 1 3 4 5 7 9 11
   Thailand 0 -1 -1 0 1 1 2 2 2 3
   Venezuela 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Vietnam 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Rest of World 0 -14 -27 -18 -38 -34 -33 -33 -38 -38
   Total Net Imports 0 -28 -51 -32 -51 -46 -48 -46 -55 -49
Price (U.S. Dollars per Metric Ton)
   FOB Price N. Europe 0.0 147.9 212.7 38.8 21.1 -27.2 -6.4 -7.5 36.3 34.3
* Total net exports are the sum of all positive net exports and negative net imports.  
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Table A3.4. Scenario 2 whole milk powder trade change
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Net Exporters (Thousand Metric Tons)
   Argentina 0 2 7 17 22 32 38 42 46 49
   Australia 0 -2 -5 -1 -3 0 3 4 5 6
   Brazil 0 9 15 12 20 19 20 21 23 24
   Chile 0 2 4 4 6 7 6 7 8 9
   Colombia 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
   EU New Member States 0 2 3 -2 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7
   European Union-15 0 -42 -69 -66 -65 -69 -70 -76 -81 -89
   New Zealand 0 -1 -1 9 4 11 15 18 19 23
   Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Ukraine 0 0 2 3 4 5 5 5 5 5
   Uruguay 0 2 7 7 9 16 9 9 10 11
   Total Net Exports 0 -27 -36 -16 -10 9 11 13 14 16
Net Importers 
   Algeria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Canada 0 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
   China 0 -13 -23 -17 -17 -12 -12 -12 -14 -14
   Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Indonesia 0 0 -1 0 -1 0 0 -1 -1 -1
   Malaysia 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1
   Mexico 0 -1 -2 0 0 0 1 2 2 3
   Peru 0 -1 -1 0 -1 0 0 -1 -1 -1
   Philippines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Russia 0 -2 -4 -8 -8 -12 -13 -15 -17 -19
   Saudi Arabia 0 -2 -3 -1 -1 0 0 0 -1 -1
   South Korea 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
   Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1
   United States 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Venezuela 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1
   Vietnam 0 -1 -1 0 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 -1
   Rest of World 0 -8 -2 10 17 35 44 51 59 66
   Total Net Imports 0 -27 -36 -16 -10 9 11 13 14 16
Price (U.S. Dollars per Metric Ton)
   FOB Price N. Europe 0.0 98.5 138.4 75.2 105.3 68.6 85.3 98.1 120.9 132.1
* Total net exports are the sum of all positive net exports and negative net imports.  
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Table A3.5. Scenario 2 Argentine dairy supply and utilization pct. change 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
(Percent)
Milk Cow Numbers 0.00 0.00 0.98 2.43 3.50 5.26 6.12 6.69 7.06 7.43
Milk Production per Cow 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cow Milk Production 0.00 0.00 0.98 2.43 3.50 5.26 6.12 6.69 7.06 7.43
Fluid Milk Consumption 0.00 -0.64 -1.09 -1.09 -1.62 -1.38 -1.30 -1.24 -1.24 -1.18
Manufacturing Use 0.00 0.15 1.48 3.28 4.74 6.85 7.90 8.58 9.03 9.46
Butter 
Production 0.00 0.35 1.74 1.99 3.51 4.55 5.49 5.94 6.53 6.76
   Domestic Supply 0.00 0.34 1.68 1.92 3.39 4.40 5.32 5.76 6.34 6.57
Consumption 0.00 -1.44 -3.64 -4.62 -8.13 -7.19 -6.77 -6.55 -6.35 -6.08
Net Exports 0.00 16.15 49.39 62.66 108.09 105.12 103.94 99.96 97.93 92.33
Ending Stocks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Domestic Use 0.00 0.34 1.68 1.92 3.39 4.40 5.32 5.76 6.34 6.57
Cheese 
Production 0.00 -0.31 -0.60 0.89 2.84 3.91 5.41 6.19 6.63 6.94
   Domestic Supply 0.00 -0.29 -0.56 0.83 2.66 3.67 5.10 5.85 6.28 6.59
Consumption 0.00 -2.03 -3.00 -3.44 -5.47 -4.53 -4.09 -3.88 -3.79 -3.59
Net Exports 0.00 9.39 13.45 26.96 51.23 49.63 53.35 54.15 53.79 52.76
Ending Stocks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Domestic Use 0.00 -0.29 -0.56 0.83 2.66 3.67 5.10 5.85 6.28 6.59
Nonfat Dry Milk 
Production 0.00 1.56 5.71 5.51 8.74 10.61 12.02 12.54 13.60 13.75
   Domestic Supply 0.00 1.49 5.48 5.30 8.42 10.24 11.62 12.15 13.19 13.35
Consumption 0.00 -2.30 -3.57 -2.67 -3.06 -2.51 -2.51 -2.35 -2.49 -2.33
Net Exports 0.00 4.78 13.15 11.84 17.58 20.17 22.24 22.64 24.14 23.89
Ending Stocks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Domestic Use 0.00 1.49 5.48 5.30 8.42 10.24 11.62 12.15 13.19 13.35
Whole Milk Powder 
Production 0.00 -0.11 0.94 3.94 5.05 8.38 10.12 11.36 12.05 12.97
   Domestic Supply 0.00 -0.10 0.88 3.71 4.76 7.90 9.54 10.73 11.39 12.28
Consumption 0.00 -2.84 -4.57 -4.72 -5.88 -5.17 -5.05 -4.87 -4.81 -4.61
Net Exports 0.00 1.25 3.69 8.33 10.82 15.64 18.37 20.32 21.42 22.87
Ending Stocks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Domestic Use 0.00 -0.10 0.88 3.71 4.76 7.90 9.54 10.73 11.39 12.28  
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Table A3.6. Scenario 2 Chilean dairy supply and utilization pct. change
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
(Percent)
Milk Cow Numbers 0.00 0.00 0.40 1.02 1.38 2.15 2.55 2.87 3.16 3.45
Milk Production per Cow 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.36 0.30 0.55 0.46 0.47 0.49 0.53
Cow Milk Production 0.00 0.00 0.61 1.38 1.69 2.71 3.01 3.36 3.67 4.00
Fluid Milk Consumption 0.00 -0.96 -1.78 -1.54 -2.82 -2.32 -2.34 -2.39 -2.50 -2.50
Manufacturing Use 0.00 0.26 1.32 2.29 3.01 4.26 4.63 5.09 5.51 5.93
Butter 
Production 0.00 1.39 4.20 0.19 -2.72 -1.07 0.92 1.40 2.68 3.00
   Domestic Supply 0.00 1.39 4.20 0.19 -2.72 -1.07 0.92 1.40 2.68 3.00
Consumption 0.00 -0.61 -1.94 -2.54 -5.27 -4.73 -4.58 -4.58 -4.59 -4.53
Net Exports 0.00 -22.58 -70.88 -36.30 -36.23 -43.92 -58.83 -62.58 -75.87 -82.48
Ending Stocks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Domestic  Use 0.00 1.39 4.20 0.19 -2.72 -1.07 0.92 1.40 2.68 3.00
Cheese 
Production 0.00 -0.27 -0.37 2.19 4.33 5.08 6.27 6.69 7.01 7.50
   Domestic Supply 0.00 -0.27 -0.37 2.19 4.33 5.08 6.27 6.69 7.01 7.50
Consumption 0.00 -0.57 -0.79 -0.83 -1.74 -1.37 -1.24 -1.24 -1.29 -1.29
Net Exports 0.00 2.33 2.96 24.12 44.28 44.85 50.49 50.03 48.35 47.51
Ending Stocks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Domestic  Use 0.00 -0.27 -0.37 2.19 4.33 5.08 6.27 6.69 7.01 7.50
Nonfat Dry Milk 
Production 0.00 1.75 4.99 -1.89 -6.92 -5.31 -1.77 -1.36 0.41 0.66
   Domestic Supply 0.00 1.48 4.23 -1.61 -5.92 -4.55 -1.52 -1.18 0.35 0.57
Consumption 0.00 -0.87 -1.27 -0.23 -0.13 0.16 0.04 0.04 -0.20 -0.19
Net Exports 0.00 -7.07 -16.71 4.35 20.22 16.92 5.69 4.72 -2.41 -3.63
Ending Stocks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Domestic  Use 0.00 1.48 4.23 -1.61 -5.92 -4.55 -1.52 -1.18 0.35 0.57
Whole Milk Powder 
Production 0.00 1.32 4.73 5.94 7.12 9.83 8.61 9.43 10.01 10.57
   Domestic Supply 0.00 1.24 4.47 5.62 6.74 9.32 8.18 8.97 9.54 10.10
Consumption 0.00 -2.01 -2.22 -0.28 -1.10 0.78 0.08 -0.10 -0.48 -0.53
Net Exports 0.00 20.68 32.85 27.46 32.27 33.83 27.69 27.35 26.76 25.86
Ending Stocks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Domestic  Use 0.00 1.24 4.47 5.62 6.74 9.32 8.18 8.97 9.54 10.10  
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Appendix 4 
Contact Information for Individuals and Agencies  
Visited During the Study Trip 
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Contacts in Argentina 
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Contacts in Chile 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
